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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Large-scale water project development is one of the most contentious areas of infrastructure 
development, physically displacing an estimated 40 to 80 million people throughout the past 
century. Overwhelming evidence of the adverse socio-economic impacts on local communities 
resulting from large dam construction has called into question whether such development truly 
benefits the majority or, rather, serves to promote elite accumulation of wealth at the expense of 
marginalized peoples. One of the most glaring issues concerning large dam development is the 
age-old question of distribution as those living in dam areas or downstream of dammed rivers 
suffer a disproportionate share of costs while enjoying few benefits. Recognized by the WCD 
(2000) as one of seven strategic priorities in decision-making concerning large dams, benefit 
sharing is one way to increase equity among stakeholders. A handful of countries around the 
world have incorporated benefit sharing mechanisms into large-scale water and hydroelectric 
projects, including Lesotho. With construction of Katse Dam beginning in the late 1980s, 
residents of Khohlo-Ntso have a quarter of a century‘s experience with Africa‘s second largest 
water transfer and hydroelectric project, the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP). While 
the adverse impacts of the LHWP on rural highlands Basotho communities has been widely 
documented, only one other study has researched benefit sharing within the LHWP.  
 
The central aim of this study was to discover what were local residents‘ perceptions of LHWP 
benefit sharing as a community living only 10 kilometers downstream of Katse Dam. This 
research utilized a qualitative case study design to gain an in-depth account of local residents‘ 
experiences, including their level of awareness of the LHWP benefit sharing mechanism, their 
experiences as a downstream community and their suggestions for transforming the LHWP into 
a more equitable project. Triangulation of qualitative methodological research techniques was 
employed to collect data including in-depth semi-structured interviews, focus groups and 
primary document analysis. The main findings of this study were that after living with Katse Dam 
for 25 years, local residents of Khohlo-Ntso are still unaware of their rights under the LHWP 
Treaty, do not know about the LHRF and have little hope of sharing benefits of the project. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 LARGE DAM DEVELOPMENT 
 
Societies have been constructing dams for human water consumption for some 5,000 
years (WCD, 2000). In the past century, more than US$2 trillionwas spent on 
construction of 45,000 dams globally (Namy, 2007). One of today‘s most contentious 
areas of infrastructure development, large dam development has generated various 
debates concerning its positive and negative impacts on the environment and human 
life. While proponents of large dam development, including national governments, 
international financial institutions, electric companies, construction companies and 
equipment producers, argue that large dam developmentis not only crucial for meeting 
societies‘ water and energy needs, but also for reaching additional development goals 
such as job creation, regional development and boosting export earnings to develop 
industrial bases, the past three decades have witnessed increasing opposition to the 
construction of large dams (WCD, 2000). Overwhelming evidence of the adverse socio-
economic impacts on millions of lives resulting from large- scale water projects has 
called into question whether such development truly benefits the majority or, rather, 
serves to promote elite accumulation of wealth at the expense of marginalized peoples. 
With sixty percent of the world‘s rivers dammed, two-thirds of large dams are 
constructed in the poorest and most remote areas of the world (Namy, 2000; Lerer& 
Scudder, 1999). Created by the World Bank (WB) and the World Conservation Union in 
1997 as a response to growing international opposition to large dam development, the 
World Commission on Dams (WCD) (2001) reported that between 40 and 80 million 
people have been physically displaced by large dams worldwide. In the past twenty 
years, hundreds of studies have documented severely adverse consequences of large 
dams on these communities, including social disarticulation, health problems, 
dispossession of livelihoods and cultural alienation (Scudder, 2005; Adams, 2000; 
Colchester, 2000; WWF, 2005).  
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Large dam proponents have been criticized for their exclusive focus on technological 
and economic aspects of such development, neglecting critical questions of human 
rights, environmental justice and distributional issues (Paiement, 2007). Planning and 
construction phases of large dams, largely carried out by consultants and contractors, 
are executed with efficiency and tend to meet designated timelines, whereas 
compensation procedures, resettlement and economic development programs are often 
delayed by years (Braun, 2010). Economic assessments of large dams are driven by 
cost-benefit analyses (CBAs) that underestimate costs and overestimate benefits of 
large-scale water development, neglecting the multitude of non-quantitative socio-
cultural negative impacts of projectsexperienced by project affected persons (PAP) 
(Adams, 2000). Thus, loss of land and other means of production are insufficiently 
compensated (if at all) and result in further impoverishment of PAP. Due to growing 
recognition of adverse impacts and increasing opposition to large water projects, the 
WB and other major financial institutions decelerated financing of large dams by the end 
of the twentieth century. However, rising fuel prices and energy needs of countries, as 
well as ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change,gave rise to revived interest 
in hydropower projects (WWF, 2005). Guidelines for ―best practice‖ concerning 
mitigation strategies of adverse impacts of large dams, including compensation, 
resettlement and economic development programs, have accompanied this renewed 
dedication to hydropower development (World Bank, 2001; van Gelder et al., 2002). Yet, 
as argued by many opponents of large dams, such guidelines are just that, limited to 
merely guiding governments and private developers rather than legally obligating them 
to restore and/or enhance PAP‘s livelihoods (Devitt & Hitchcock, 2010). As will be 
demonstrated, these guidelines are insufficient to protect PAP from the socio-economic, 
psychological and cultural destruction of large dams. 
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1.2 EQUITABLE BENEFIT SHARING 
 
One of the most glaring issues concerning large dam development is the age-old 
question of distribution. With construction taking place in remote areas, projects transfer 
large amounts of water from rural populations to urban areas, mostly for industrial and 
private water consumption (WCD, 2000). In addition to loss of stable water resources, 
rural inhabitants of large dam sites and downstream communities lose numerous other 
resources critical to sustaining livelihoods. Thus PAP suffer a disproportionate burden of 
the costs associated with large-scale water transfer and hydroelectric projects. While 
ethical considerations of this fact lead many, including the WCD, to argue for 
prioritization of PAP in distribution of benefits, this is unremittingly not the case 
(Milewski et al., 1999). Rather, as Brody (1999) states, ―most dams take a set of 
resources - a river and the lands along its banks, generating food and livelihood for local 
people; and transform them into another set of resources - a reservoir, hydro power and 
irrigation, providing benefits to people living elsewhere‖ (in Adams, 2000: 3). The 
benefits of expanding infrastructure, electricity provision and increased industrial 
capacity, championed by proponents of large hydropower projects, rarely reach rural 
communities. This unequal distribution of costs and benefits of large dam development 
(and megaproject development in general) is one of the most commonly cited criticisms 
of large dams (Adams, 2000).  
 
Recognized by the WCD (2000) as one of seven strategic priorities in decision-making 
concerning large dams, benefit sharing is one way to increase equity among 
stakeholders. A novelty in large-scale water infrastructure development, benefit sharing 
has most commonly referred to institutional arrangements for management of shared 
water resources between riparian states (Cernea, 2008; White et al., 2008). However, of 
late, the term has been used in relation to distribution of profits generated by large 
hydropower and water transfer projects (Milewski et al., 1999; Egre et al., 2002; White 
et al., 2008). Based on the theory of economic rent (expanded upon in the second 
chapter of this report), benefit sharing can take monetary (revenue sharing, free or 
preferential electricity rate or development funds) or non-monetary (priority allocation of 
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resource rights such as fishing, hunting, irrigation, preferential hiring or training) forms 
(Paiement, 2007). A handful of countries around the world, including Lesotho, have 
incorporated benefit sharing mechanisms into large-scale water and hydroelectric 
projects. The few studies examining benefit sharing in large dam projects report mixed 
results and demonstrate a need for further research of stakeholders‘ (especially PAP‘s) 
experience with such mechanisms (Egre et al., 2002; Milewski et al., 1999). The 
research at hand attempts to begin filling this gap. 
 
 
1.3 AIMS AND JUSTIFICATION OF THE STUDY 
 
The principal focus of this study is one project-affected community‘s experience with 
equitable benefit sharing within the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP). With 
construction of Phase 1A (Katse Dam) beginning in the late 1980s, residents of Khohlo-
Ntso (the Basotho highland community under study) have a quarter of a century‘s 
experience with Africa‘s second largest water transfer and hydroelectric project (LHDA, 
1999). Located 10 kilometers downstream from Katse Dam (one of five LHWP dams 
planned to be constructed), the village has undergone major transformations and 
experienced both direct and indirect impacts of the LHWP. While various studies have 
documented consequences of the binational water transfer project on different groups of 
Basotho throughout the past fifteen years, only one other study has researched LHWP 
benefit sharing from PAP‘s perspectives (and less than a handful have explored benefit 
sharing within the LHWP) (Mokorosi & van der Zaag, 2006; Egre et al., 2002). In 
addition, few studies have explored the experiences of downstream PAP in Lesotho, 
with the majority investigating resettled LHWPpopulations and their host communities 
(Hoover, 2001; Matli, 2005; Thamae & Pottinger, 2006). 
 
The central research question in this qualitative case study is: What have residents of 
Khohlo-Ntso experienced as stakeholders of LHWP‘s benefit sharing scheme? 
Subsidiary questions this research attempts to address include:  
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*What level of awareness do residents of Khohlo-Ntso possess concerning the LHWP 
and its benefit sharing mechanism? 
 
*Do local residents believe they are equitably sharing benefits of the LHWP? 
 
*What do local residents perceive to be the most influential impacts of the LHWP on 
their lives and livelihoods? 
 
*Were local residents involved in development of benefit sharing mechanisms? 
 
*After 25 years experience with the LHWP, what advice would local residents give to 
residents of Polihali (the site of the fourth dam where construction will commence next 
year)? 
 
As millions of people throughout the world continue to suffer immense disruptions in 
their lives as a result of large dam development (which indicates no signs of ceasing in 
the near future), equitable benefit sharing has the potential to drastically reduce or 
mitigate adverse impacts of large dams on local communities. While few countries have 
enacted legal frameworks obligating large dam developers to share profits with PAP, 
further research will not only contribute to the growing body of information on such 
benefit sharing mechanisms, but may also help to influence top decision-makers in 
establishing legislation requiring equity in the share of both costs and benefits of large 
dams (Paiement, 2007). As participation of PAP in the development of benefit sharing 
mechanisms has been minimal, exploring this issue from their perspectives is 
exceptionally important in documenting their experiences, needs, desires and beliefs 
about equitable benefit sharing. Finally, despite mountains of evidence that the project 
has impoverished a majority of the Basotho population, the Project continues with three 
more dams in their planning phases, potentially displacing thousands more Basotho, 
thus it is of utmost importance that PAP share their experiences with other Basotho 
communities who will live in close proximity or reside downstream of other large LHWP 
dams. 
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1.4 DEFINITION OF OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS 
 
Defined below are concepts used frequently throughout this report: 
 
Local Residentsin this context refers to the residents of Khohlo-Ntso. 
 
Communityis defined in this document as a group or groups of people living 
together within close proximity sharing similar cultural values and social patterns.  
 
Householdin this context means either one person living alone or a group of people 
living in the same housing unit sharing at least one meal per day 
 
Livelihoodcomprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social 
resources) and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable 
when it can cope with and recover from stress and shocks and maintain or enhance 
its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the 
natural resource base. (Chambers & Conway, 1991). 
 
Dispossessionrefers here to ―the deprivation of land, common resources, homes 
and other assets depended on for livelihood and/or cultural practices‖ (Namy, 2007: 
1). 
 
Social Impacts are defined as changes in how people live, work, play, and interact 
with one another on a day-to-day basis; changes in people‘s culture such as shared 
beliefs, customs, values and languages; and changes in the community including 
social cohesion, stability, character, services and the community; changes in 
people‘s environment, their health and wellbeing, and in their fears and aspirations 
(Vanclay, 2002). 
 
Social Impact Assessment (SIA) is the ―processes of analyzing, monitoring and 
managing the intended and unintended social consequences, both positive and 
negative, of planned interventions and any social change processes invoked by 
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these interventions‖ (Namy, 2007). 
 
Implementing agencyin this report refers to the Lesotho Highlands Development 
Authority (LHDA). 
 
The Projectmeans the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP). 
 
Large Damhere refers to any dam with a height of 15 meters or more from the 
foundation and/or is between 5 and 15meters high with a reservoir volume of more 
than 3 million cubed meters (WCD, 2000). 
 
The Treaty refers to an agreement signed between the government of Lesotho and 
the government of the Republic of South Africa in 1986 concerning the LHWP. 
 
Resettlementin this context means the permanent moving of people living in the 
path of a development intervention, such as a dam or related infrastructure, in which 
such people are provided with compensation, housing, new lands, services, etc. (de 
Wet, 1999). 
 
Reparationis any action or process that repairs or makes amends for damages 
inflicted by large dam projects (Scudder, 2005). 
 
Mitigationin this context refers to ―changes to project design, operations and/or 
project area management to reduce levels of impact and/or resource losses‖ (LHDA, 
2002:61). 
 
Compensationrefers to ―cash, goods or services offered to replace resources 
which are unavoidably lost or activities which are impeded as a result of project 
development and implementation‖ (LHDA, 2002:61). 
 
Downstreamin this study refers to the area, people, or impacts of large dams below 
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the source of a river or its current. 
 
Transboundary is defined as a water system that crosses national boundaries and 
provides resources to more than one nation or country (Guerquin et al., 2003). 
 
Equity in this context means ―the equal distribution of wealth or resources among 
sectors or individuals of society‖ (Mokorosi & van der Zaag, 2006: 4). 
 
Benefit Sharingin this document is defined as ―a direct monetary redistribution of 
project-related revenues or profits to project-affected populations, associated with 
the existence of an economic rent‖ (Egre et al., 2002: 2). 
 
Project-affected persons refer to people whose economic, social and cultural lives 
are negatively affected by construction of dams, related infrastructure, or alteration 
of river flows and any ecological consequences including displaced people, host 
communities and downstream and upstream populations (WCD, 2000). 
 
Political Willhere means the commitment or dedication of a government, parastatal 
organization or political figure to exercise political authority for the benefit of project-
affected persons. 
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CHAPTER TWO : LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
Photo 1: One highland area in Lesotho. 
 
2.1 LARGE DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1.1 Theoretical Justifications 
 
Theoretical justifications behind large-scale water development can be traced back to 
development thinking of the 1950s dominated by neo-classical Western economists‘ 
espousal of Rostow‘s modernization theory, which defines five linear stages of 
economic development, namely traditional society, pre-conditions to takeoff, takeoff, 
growth to maturity and lastly, mass consumption (Rostow, 1978). During this time, when 
development approaches focused on economic growth and modern scientific 
knowledge, this school of thought assumed that all societies would move in an 
evolutionary unilinear forward direction, leaving no room for reversal, deviation, or 
omission of stages in development (Schuurman, 2000). Theories of development were 
based largely on the experiences of developed countries, thus modernization theory 
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was believed to be the one and only way forward for underdeveloped country‘s to gain 
prosperity.  
 
Rather than address the decades of colonist exploitation of resources and indigenous 
peoples as inherent causes of underdevelopment in the global South, 1950s 
neoclassical economists saw the diffusion of finance and technology as the main 
solution to enhancing economic growth and spurring development in colonized or newly 
independent countries. This was also a period when Western countries were seeking 
both fresh supplies of raw materials for their rapidly industrializing economies and new 
markets to distribute manufactured products. Large dams were especially fitting for such 
approaches to modernization and development as they necessitated southern countries 
to import large quantities of technological innovations and required significant amounts 
of finance from Western countries, thus a major boom in large dam development 
occurred at this time (WCD, 2000). 
 
While development paradigms espousing the modernization theory shifted to paradigms 
focused on poverty alleviation in the 1970s, and then most recently to development 
approaches promoting sustainable locally based economic development through 
poverty reduction, environmental conservation, social justice and human rights, the 
Eurocentric, limited approach of modernization theory, which neglects diversity of local 
cultures and identities as well as the skewed political nature of ―underdeveloped 
countries‖, still underpins large dam development today(Qaddumi, 2003; Oliver-Smith, 
2009). Large financial institutions and many southern governments, including Lesotho 
and South Africa, persist in embracing approaches to development in which the 
transformation of societies through massive megaproject development is predicted to 
bring about significant agricultural and industrial growth accompanied by increased 
living standards for societies in their entirety (Ferguson, 1994; World Bank, 2010). For 
example, overly optimistically predicting the LHWP‘s benefits to Lesotho, a 1991 WB 
report stated that  
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no other project has been identified that would have anywhere near as large a 
beneficial impact on Lesotho…benefits include employment opportunities, both 
directly and indirectly, and are estimated to be between 7,000-10,000 jobs during 
the peak construction period…construction of housing and roads…promotion of 
agriculture…and tourism (World Bank, 1991: iv). 
 
Embedded in this belief of large-scale development as the main solution to world 
poverty, is the idea of ―national best interest‖ or ―development for the good of all‖ found 
in the public interest perspective on development (Penz, 1997; Colchester, 2000). The 
―national best interest‖ justification of large dam development argues that certain 
interests and needs of individual citizens and communities must be sacrificed in the 
name of enhancing overall well-being of the society as a whole (Penz, 1997). Under this 
rationale, numerous nations make legal allowances for the right to eminent domain (or 
expropriation of private or communal property in the name of national interest), claiming 
that the benefits of large-scale development occurring on such land will eventually 
outweigh sacrifices forced upon smaller groups within the society (Colchester, 2000). 
Decisions regarding which projects fall under the category of ―national best interest‖ are 
usually motivated by quantitative CBAs that fail to take into accountsocio-cultural costs 
of projects whose values are not easily translated into exact figures, such as disruption 
of community and family unity, ancestral beliefs and other cultural practices and 
psychological well-being (WCD, 2000).  
 
Additionally, large-scale development projects such as large dams tend to fall victim to 
cost over-runs and benefit shortfalls due to the exaggerated benefits on paper by 
prospective developers seeking funder approval. Described by Flyvberg (2005) as the 
―Machiavellian world of underestimated costs and overestimated benefits‖ in which a 
―culture of covert lying‖ emphasizes benefits of projects to gain project funder approval, 
megaproject development rarely follows CBA predictions (Flyvberg, 2005: 21). Instead, 
projects often end up experiencing cost over-runs of more than 50 percent and cause 
devastating impacts on local populations (Flyvberg, 2009). Yet, despite the host of 
evidence pointing to these problems, large water transfer and hydroelectric projects 
continue to be championed as a dominant means of economic transformation claimed 
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to benefit the majority. 
 
2.1.2Impacts of Large Dam Development 
 
The international experience with impacts of large-scale water and hydropower projects 
has been widely documented over the past four decades (Scudder, 1982; Cernea, 
1995; Weist, 1995; Tilt et al., 2008). Impacts can be both positive and negative, yet the 
distribution of costs and benefits of such megaproject development is highly unbalanced 
with local rural communities bearing a disproportional burden of costs (WCD, 2000). 
The benefits of large dams cited by dam proponents (and most often exaggerated on 
paper to gain funder approval) include cleaner and more renewable energy, local 
employment and skills development, increased access to services related to education, 
health and trade (because of expanded physical infrastructure such as roads and 
clinics), job creation, industrial growth, electrification, and increased export capability 
(Cernea, 1997; WCD, 2000). While such positive impacts on the micro and macro-
economies of countries look great on paper, they most often do not becomes realities 
on the ground (Flyvberg, 2009). On the other hand, the adverse impacts of large-scale 
water projects, felt mostly by local communities for which elusive benefits translate into 
dissipated hope are vast and include what Cernea (2004) has categorized into four 
main classes of social impacts including forced population displacement and 
impoverishment, boomtown formation around major constructions, downstream 
unanticipated changes in agro-production systems and loss of cultural heritage assets. 
While other sociologists have grouped the social impacts of large dams into somewhat 
different descriptions, such as Tilt et al.‘s (2008) effects on rural economy; effects on 
health, culture, health and gender; and effects on infrastructure transportation and 
housing, this study embraces Cernea‘s (2004) classification system as it is particularly 
relevant to the experiences of residents of Khohlo-Ntso (which will be demonstrated in 
the final chapter of this report).  
 
The most comprehensive international study researching large dams worldwide is the 
WCD report (2000) Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision Making, 
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which provided 8 detailed case studies of large dams, presented surveys of 125 
additional water projects, 2 country evaluations and 17 thematic reviews on issues 
connected with large dam development. The WCD (2000) found that distribution of 
costs and benefits of large-scale water development over the past century is 
overwhelmingly unbalanced and that major changes need to be adopted in decision-
making regarding large dams. The report outlined five core values that need to be 
applied to decision-making processes including equity, efficiency, participatory decision-
making, sustainability and accountability. These five core values were based on seven 
strategic principles which included gaining public acceptance, comprehensive options 
assessment, addressing existing dams, sustaining rivers and livelihoods, recognizing 
entitlements and sharing benefits, ensuring compliance and sharing rivers for peace, 
development and security (WCD, 2000). In addition, the WCD‘s 26 guidelines for 
engaging in best practice large-scale water development are outlined in Figure 2 on the 
following page.  
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Figure 2 : WCD (2000) 7 Strategic Priorities and 26 Guidelines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strategic Priority 1: Gaining Public 
Acceptance 
 
1 Stakeholder Analysis 
2 Negotiated Decision-Making Processes 
3 Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
 
Strategic Priority 2: Comprehensive 
Options Assessment 
 
4 Strategic Impact Assessment for 
Environmental, Social, Health and Cultural 
Heritage Issues 
5 Project-Level Impact Assessments for 
Environmental, Social, Health and Cultural 
Heritage Issues 
6 Multi-Criteria Analysis 
7 Life Cycle Assessment 
8 Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
9 Distributional Analyses of Projects 
10 Valuation of Social and Environmental 
Impacts 
11 Improving Economic Risk Assessment 
 
Strategic Priority 3: Addressing 
Existing Dams 
 
12 Ensuring Operating Rules Reflect Social 
and Environmental Concerns 
13 Improving Reservoir Operations 
 
Strategic Priority 4: Sustaining 
Rivers and Livelihoods 
 
14 Baseline Ecosystem Surveys 
15 Environmental Flow Assessment 
16 Maintaining Productive Fisheries 
Strategic Priority 5: Recognizing 
Entitlements and Sharing Benefits 
17 Baseline Social Conditions 
18 Impoverishment Risk Analysis 
19 Implementation of the Mitigation, 
Resettlement and Development ActionPlan 
20 Project Benefit-Sharing Mechanisms 
 
Strategic Priority 6: 
EnsuringCompliance 
 
21 Compliance Plans 
22 Independent Review Panels for Social 
and Environmental Matters 
23 Performance Bonds 
24 Trust Funds 
25 Integrity Pacts 
 
Strategic Priority 7: Sharing Riversfor 
Peace, Development, andSecurity 
 
26 Procedures for Shared Rivers 
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While the WCD report (2000) marked groundbreaking research, largely influencing 
subsequent studies on large-scale water projects, the findings have had limited success 
in influencing large dam funders‘ and developers‘ policies and practices (McDonald-
Wilmsen & Webber, 2010). Major international financiers of large dams such as the WB 
and ADB never officially adopted WCD guidelines despite assertions that these 
organizations share WCD (2000) core values and concerns. In a published response to 
the WCD report, the WB writes,“the World Bank‟s conclusion on the guidelines is best 
summarized by the Chair of the WCD, who has explained that “our guidelines offer 
guidance, not a regulatory framework. They are not laws to be obeyed rigidly….They 
are guidelines with a small „g‟‖ (World Bank, 2001: 1) The WB response to the WCD 
(2000) then outlines main differences between their policies and WCD guidelines.  
 
The most notable of these divergences concern the WCD‘s (2000) recommendations 
that local communities living in areas where dams are planned for construction give free 
and informed consent before developers may continue with projectsand also that PAP 
should be directly involved with decision-making regarding development and mitigation 
plans. Rather than grant such participatory power in decision-making processes that 
would drastically impact their lives, the WB asserts that the ―state has the right to make 
decisions that it regards as being in the best interest of the community as a whole, and 
to determine the use of natural resources based on national priorities‖ (World Bank, 
2001: 2). The document then inserts ―free and meaningful consultations‖ with local 
populations in place of the WCD‘s (2000) ―prior, free and informed consent‖ (World 
Bank, 2001: 3; WCD, 2000: 215). As the primary financial backer of large dam 
development, such watered-down rhetoric has been criticized for justifying continued 
Bank involvement in what is estimated to be a potentially US$1 trillion market (Cernea, 
1997; Shiva, 2002). The causes for hesitant adoption of WCD (2000) guidelines on the 
part of large dam funders and developers become apparent when one gains an 
understanding of the politics behind massive water infrastructure projects, namely 
hydropolitics. 
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2.1.3 Hydropolitics 
 
Justifications of the increasing commodification of water throughout the world (by large 
transnational firms and international financial giants such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the WB) are based on hegemonic neoliberal market paradigms 
that proclaim that the distribution of water through free markets to regions of water 
scarcity will increase water prices (reflecting its true economic value) and thus lead to 
overall environmental conservation of this essential natural resource (Shiva, 2002). 
Such justifications overlook the social value of water, placing collective water rights 
enjoyed by humans for all of time in the hands of super powerful transnational 
corporations, further entrenching existing inequalities in the distribution of natural 
resources (Kitissou, 2004; Adams, 2000). While proponents of large dams argue that 
the central aim of this form of large-scale infrastructure development is toboost national 
economies, therefore benefitting large portions of societies, their adversaries 
accusesuch proponents of using megaproject water development as a central means to 
recolonize the global South (McDonald, 2009; Bond, 2004; Oliver-Smith, 2009).As both 
rural local populations and marginalized urban dwellers are deprived of their basic 
human right to water (often rendered unaffordable due to the costly development of 
large water transfer schemes and hydroelectric power plants), large mining and other 
industrial giants become the real beneficiaries of massive public spending that goes into 
such projects (McDonald, 2009).  
 
South Africa and Lesotho are especially pertinent examples of what Turton (2002) has 
defined as hydropolitics or the  ―authoritative allocation of values in society with respect 
to water‖ (Turton, 2002: 16).As the LHWP increased the foreign debt owed to 
international financial institutions of both South Africa and Lesotho by tens of millions, 
rural and urban water users alike are suffering from the lack of availability and 
unaffordable prices of water. In Maseru (the capitol of Lesotho), some urban water 
users are required to deposit R2-5 into community water stations, which purchases only 
one ten liter bucket of this essential life source. Thousands of urban Johannesburg 
township residents have had their basicsupplies cut off after not being able to afford 
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increasingly higher electric and water bills in Johannesburg. With the definition of water 
shifting from that of a common good to a private good, the hydropolitics of large dam 
development is at the center of the erosion of the basic right of human beings to water. 
It is no wonder that after the WTO identified the water industry as the most profitable 
sector for investors, the WB and IMF began attaching water privatization as a condition 
for developing countries to access/renew loans (Shiva, 2002; Kitissou, 2004). 
 
2.2 SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
 
Social impact assessment is a tool used largely by sociologists, developers and 
governments for addressing the consequences of development policies and large 
development projects on human populations. The U.S. National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969set the stage for development of social impact assessments (SIAs) and this 
approach has been used in numerous studies researching the effects of large dam 
projects on PAP (Lockie, 2007; Cernea, 1997; WDC, 2000). While the 1969 U.S. Act 
limited the definition of SIA to a technical approach concerned with both predicting and 
measuring impacts of development with certainty and accuracy, a large school of 
sociologists view SIA as a philosophy connecting development with equity and 
democracy rather than merely a methodological tool measuring development 
interventions (Lockie, 2007; Vanclay, 2002). In the past few decades, researchers have 
used SIA as a framework that  
 
embodies all human impacts including aesthetic impacts (landscape analysis), 
archaeological (heritage) impacts, community impacts, cultural impacts, 
demographic impacts, development impacts, economic and fiscal impacts, 
gender assessment, health impacts, indigenous rights, infrastructural impacts, 
institutional impacts, political impacts (human rights, governance, 
democratization etc.), poverty assessment, psychological impacts, resource 
issues (access and ownership of resources), tourism impacts, and other impacts 
on societies (Vanclay, 2002: 2). 
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Thus SIA is particularly suited for assessing impacts of large-scale water projects on 
PAP as this form of megaproject development involves almost every category of 
impacts listed above. After growing recognition that an internationally standardized form 
of SIA was needed to assess the impacts of large dams, the International Association 
for Impact Assessment (IAIA) established a set of agreed upon principles that could be 
applied to all large dam projects. Included in these principles are protection of 
biodiversity, cultural heritage and diversity, commitment to the precautionary principle, 
adherence to basic human rights, equitable development  the internalization of costs of 
large-scale water projects (Tilt et al., 2008). Utilized by a multitude of organizations and 
researchers over the past few decades including the WB, WCD, UN, anthropologists 
and sociologists alike, SIA has been integral in providing evidence of the massive 
disruption large dams have on every aspect of life in human societies around the world 
(Cernea, 1997; WCD, 2000; UN, 2007;Namy, 2007; Vanclay, 2002; Lockie, 2007). The 
study at hand followed closely with other research on large dam development, using 
SIA principles, especially those concerned with equity and internalization of costs, to 
assess how local residents of Khohlo-Ntso have experienced benefit sharing within the 
LHWP. In line with studies using SIA as a guideline for researching impacts of large 
dam policy and development, this study attempted to contribute to ultimately changing 
the way in which large-scale water projects are handled in order for PAP interests to be 
prioritized.  
 
2.3 DEVELOPMENT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT 
 
The WB estimates that more than four million people are displaced by large dams each 
year (World Bank, 2004). Of all large-scale development projects, large dams have 
displaced more people than any other form of megaproject development (Thukral, 1992). 
Displacement is not limited to forced physical removal of communities from places of 
residence, but also includes livelihood displacement in which PAPs‘ means of 
production are interrupted or destroyed by large dam construction and related 
infrastructure (WCD, 2000). 
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Thukral (1992) identifies three categories of displacement induced by large dams. The 
first kind of development-induced displacement(DID), and the most commonly referred 
to form of DID, involves PAP who are directly impacted by the dispossession of their 
land and properties, which are acquired by nation-states or developers in order to make 
way for construction of dam walls, inundation of lands to create reservoirs and/or 
construction of related dam infrastructure. Directly displaced PAP are forced to move 
out of their homes and leave areas where most have lived for generations. The second 
and third categories of DID concern those PAP who are indirectly affected by large dam 
development. They include PAP whose land-use patterns have changed due to loss of 
resources or other means of livelihoods as a consequence of projects (such as the exit 
of masses of construction workers who had served as a customer base for small 
business enterprises) and are thus forced to leave the area in search of work, or those 
PAP who are impacted by environmental changes resulting from reduced river flows 
(usually downstream communities). While PAP who are directly impacted are frequently 
compensated and assisted with resettlement, the second and third categories of DID 
victims are most often left to fend for themselves (Thukral, 1992). Located only 10 km 
downstream from Katse Dam, this study included participants who have experienced 
the second and third categories of displacement.  
 
The two key models of DID developed over the past forty years of experience with large 
dam development address only the first category of PAP, those who have been forced 
to move from their homes and lands due to large dam construction. These include the 
Scudder-Colsen model of DID resettlement (commonly referred to DIDR) developed by 
Scudder andColsen throughoutthe 1970s and early 1980s after lengthy anthropological 
research of the impacts of the Kariba resettlement scheme in which nearly 60,000 
Gwembe Tonga peoples were directly displaced by the Kariba Dam project in Zambia, 
andCernea‘s (1995, 1997) Impoverishment, Risks and Reconstruction (IRR) approach 
to DID formulated in the early 1990s (McDonald-Wilmsen& Webber, 2010). The first 
sociological model attempting to understand and predict responses of communities, 
households and individuals to resettlement, the Scudder-Colsen (1982) predictive 
model was groundbreaking work. The model identifies and distinguishes between four 
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stages of relocation including recruitment, transition, preferential development and 
handing over/incorporation. Concentrating on the common behavioral tendencies of 
resettlees through each stage, the Scudder-Colsen (1982) model was initially developed 
to describe stages of voluntary resettlement and later used in explanations of 
involuntary resettlement. However, after various studies throughout the 1980s and 
1990s pointed to increasing evidence that the stages were not applicable to cases of 
involuntary resettlement, it was widely acknowledged that a new model was needed to 
explain impoverishment in forced resettlement schemes (Stanley, 2004). 
 
Thus Cernea (1995) developed the IRR approach as a new predictive model of 
responses to DIDR. Today‘s most influential approach to contemporary studies on DIDR, 
the IRR model identifies principal risks inherent in DIDR and ways in which PAP 
reconstruct their livelihoods after displacement and resettlement (Cernea, 1995, 1999). 
The seven risks identified by Cernea include landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, 
food insecurity, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common property 
resources and community disarticulation. Expanding on these impoverishment risks, 
Mahapatra (1999) proposed that loss of educational opportunities be added to the list 
and Mathur (1998) suggested that the list be extended to include loss of access to 
public resources. Cernea‘s IRR model has been criticized for neglecting the 
vulnerabilities and capabilities of resettled PAP (Muggah, 2000) as well as what some 
deem the unrealistically optimistic assumption that preemptive planning can drastically 
reduce risks of DIDR (de Wet, 2001). The IRR model was an important component of 
the WCD‘s (2000) development of its Strategic Priorities and Guidelines, linking the 
adverse impacts of DID with human rights.  
 
While these two key DIDR models have been crucial to understanding the risks and 
adverse impacts of DIDR experienced by PAP, those directly affected by DID are only a 
small proportion of people whose lives and livelihoods have been interrupted or 
destroyed by large dam development. Relatively few studies have focused on the risks, 
social processes and responses of PAP who live in the vicinity of dam works but are not 
resettled or downstream communities that face devastating consequences of indirect 
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DID (Adams, 2000). In the past decade recognition of other categories of PAP by the 
WCD (2000) include host communities of resettlees, project immigrants and those PAP 
who have experienced livelihood displacement. More updated work of Scudder‘s (1996, 
1999) points out the need for further research examining DID in this wider context rather 
than exclusive focus on physical displacement of PAP (Thukral, 1992). While the scope 
of this study did not allow for a comprehensive assessment of impacts of the LHWP on 
Khohlo-Ntso‘s downstream community as the focus was local residents‘ experiences 
with benefit sharing mechanisms, many adverse impacts were noted by participants, 
thus this study hopes to contribute to greater understanding of PAP indirectly affected 
by large dam development. 
 
2.4 DOWNSTREAM COMMUNITIES 
 
Populations living downstream of large dam projects are the most numerous yet also 
most neglected of all ―victims of development‖ (Horowitz, 1991). The socio-economic 
impacts of large dams on downstream PAPs are caused by changes in the amounts 
and timing of river flows on which aquatic and riparian ecosystems rely. As the effect of 
river flows in these ecosystems is complex and not well understood, even less is known 
about the impacts of altering river flows on aquatic and floodplain biodiversity and 
downstream communities (McDowell et al., 1996). Such impacts occur over long 
periods of time and can stretch for hundreds of kilometers downriver (Adams, 2000). 
The few studies that have attempted to document downstream impacts of large dam 
development found evidence that downstream PAP suffer both material and non-
material consequences including reduced water quality, fish populations, dry-season 
grazing areas, waterfowland decreased fertility of cropland (van Gelder et al., 2002; 
Adams, 2000; Hoover, 2001; Hirji & Davis, 2009). In addition, reduced river flows can 
lead to increases of black fly and other pest populations that deteriorate animal health, 
exotic plant encroachment and water-borne diseases such as malaria, filariasis and 
schistosomiasis (van Gelder et al., 2002). Livelihoods of downstream communities are 
closely connected with the health of river ecosystems, making them especially 
vulnerable to such changes in aquatic biodiversity. 
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While the WB and several other large dam funders and developers have established 
guidelines for resettled PAP populations, a policy vacuum exists for communities living 
downriver whose livelihoods, social networks and cultures depend on the steady flow of 
water that nature has provided (Adams, 2000). However, recent recognition of the 
severe impacts of large dams on downstream PAP is leading to innovative 
environmental assessment techniques thatlend promise to filling this vacuum (WCD, 
2000; Hirji & Davis, 2009). Environmental flows refer to the ―quality, quantity, and timing 
of water flows to maintain the components, functions, processes, and resilience of water 
ecosystems that provide goods and services to people‖ (Hirji & Davis, 2009: xiii). The 
incorporation of environmental flow assessments (EFAs) into water management 
decision-making is a young and still developing field that requires costly and time-
consuming studies, substantial institutional capacity and strong political will. Leading the 
way in integrating EFAs into water allocation policy, South Africa‘s new water law has 
been highly influential in increasing visibility of downstream impacts of large dams (Hirji 
& Panella, 2003).  
 
Constructed and implemented at a time when environmental impact assessments 
(EIAs) were a relatively new practice internationally, EIAs were neither conducted for 
upstream nor for downstream PAP communities affected by the LHWP (LHDA, 2002). 
However, after various studies (presented in the following section) documented the 
tremendous adverse impacts of LHWP Phase 1A on local villages, the WB required 
LHDA to perform an EIA for Phase 1B that led to somewhat improved compensation 
and resettlement procedures. In addition, an instream flow requirement (IFR) study was 
conducted in 1997 to assess downstream impacts of the LHWP. The IFR study 
developed what the WB claims is ―from a methodological point of view, the most 
comprehensive effort supported by the World Bank to address EFR in project 
development‖, namely the Downstream Response to Imposed Flow Transformation 
(DRIFT). Developed specifically for the LHWP IFR study, DRIFT assesses EIAs from a 
biophysical, social and economic standpoint, taking into consideration flow alterations 
impacts on all aspects of PAP livelihoods (Hirji & Panella; LHDA, 2002; LHDA, 2004).  
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The IFR study set up downstream flow scenarios in which estimates of downstream 
impacts of the LHWP were made based on such scenarios with assessed variation of 
impacts depending on differing levels of water released to downstream water channels 
from the Katse Dam.  These included the actual Treaty scenario where 90-95 percent of 
water is diverted from downstream rivers, a hypothetical baseline scenario with 40-45 
percent of water diverted and two intermediate scenarios in which water releases from 
dams varied, but fell between the Treaty and baseline scenarios. The IFR study found 
that each scenario resulted in significant adverse impacts on downstream communities, 
with the baseline scenario causing minimal impacts compared to the other scenarios. 
Most importantly, the study reported that the Treaty scenario caused severe changes in 
the geomorphology and water quality of downstream rivers, estimating that acute 
reductions in fuelwood, wild vegetables, medicinal plants, bird life, fish populations, river 
sand and animal fodder would significantly reduce local populations‘ abilities to sustain 
livelihoods.  
 
Limiting populations at risk (PAR) to a 5 km band on either side of the Malibamats‘o, 
Senqunyane and Matsoku rivers for 100 km downstream of Katse Dam, the study 
calculated that approximately 155,000 people would be severelyimpacted by changes in 
downstream river flows under the Treaty scenario (LHDA, 2002; LHDA, 2004). 
Estimates of loss of material resources to these PAP came to more than US$2 million 
per year, many times the amount of average income in Lesotho (Hirji & Davis, 2009). 
LHDA responded to the study by agreeing to alter flow releases from Katse and Mohale 
Dams three and four times the minimum Treaty requirements, respectively. In addition, 
it was decided that losses to 23 downstream communities living in proximal reaches of 
the dams would be given communal cash compensation of differing amounts. These 
communalcompensation payments would be dispersed in two stages, the firstin May of 
2004 and a second payment after further IFR studies were conducted at an unspecified 
later date (LHDA, 2004). 
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Photo 1: Water being released from Katse Dam 
 in accordance with new IFR policies. 
 
 
2.5 LESOTHO SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
 
Lesotho has one of the poorest and most unequal societies in the world (Thamae & 
Pottinger, 2006). With one-third of the population (of approximately 2.1 million people) 
living under one dollar a day, many Basotho people struggle to meet their basic needs 
and live in abject poverty (Devitt & Hitchcock, 2010). By 2003, Lesotho was one of 
seven other southern African countries requiring six million tons of food aid per year 
(Matli, 2005). Divided into four geographic zones with differing agro-climatic conditions, 
including the foothills (15 percent of the country), the lowlands (20 percent), the Senqu 
River Valley (4 percent) and the highlands (60 percent), 86 percent of the population 
reside in rural areas. The country faces serious environmental and resource constraints, 
with water deemed its only abundant resource (World Bank, 2010). As only 10 percent 
of land in Lesotho is arable and the country is plagued by sheet erosion, poor topsoil 
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and overgrazing, Basotho farmers have experienced steadily declining agricultural 
yields since the 1950s (Hoover, 2001; Motsamai et al., 2003). Historically a cheap labor 
reserve for South African mines throughout the 20th century, mining remittances played 
a crucial role in sustaining livelihoods (making up 40 percent of the GDP) up until the 
mid-1990s when significant numbers of Basotho miners have been retrenched due to 
increasing mechanization of the industry and thus lower labour demands in South Africa  
(Braun, 2010; Turner, 2001; Devitt & Hitchcock, 2010). Additionally, Lesotho has the 
third highest prevalence rate of HIV/AIDS in the world and is home to more than 
140,000 orphans (Braun, 2010; Motsamai et al., 2003; UNICEF, 2005). 
 
With one of the top ten greatest income disparities globally, the richest ten percent of 
Basotho enjoy 43.4 percent of the total income in Lesotho, while the poorest ten percent 
share only 0.9 percent (Matli, 2005). The most destitute Basotho people reside in the 
highlands, also home to all major LHWP infrastructure, where communal land tenure 
systems empower chiefs and headmen (barena) to allocate grazing and cropland to 
local residents (Sechaba Consultants, 2000). Sixty-five percent of mountain land is used 
for grazing and livestock production, while less than one percent of the country is under 
forest area (Motsamai et al., 2003). Recent estimates find that more than 40 percent of 
the country is unemployed, living under the current poverty line of US$1.2 per day (with 
estimates reaching 60-70 percent for highlands residents) (UNICEF, 2005). Adhering to 
the WB‘s and International Monetary Fund‘s structural adjustment conditions attached 
to loans, which Lesotho adopted in the early 1990s, the country‘s national fiscal and 
economic policies of reduced state funding for education and other public programs 
work against poor Basotho (Maema & Reynolds, 1995). The geopolitical structure of 
wealth and power comes at a great disadvantage to highlands residents where 
communal resources (such as water) are highly prone to elite capture and are used to 
benefit the state and urban areas (Tilt et al., 2008; Turner, 2001).  
 
Lesotho is no stranger to foreign aid. As an enclave of ―freedom‖ inside South Africa‘s 
apartheid state throughout the second half of the twentieth century, Lesotho has 
received enormous amounts of external development aid over the past forty years 
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(Ferguson, 1994; Tilt et al., 2008). More than 26 countries and 72 international agencies 
and non- and quasi-governmental aid organizations have provided Lesotho with tens of 
millions (USD) of development assistance during this time (Ferguson, 1994). The failure 
of development programs to alleviate poverty and enhance Basotho livelihoods has 
been attributed to unrealistic funder assessments of Lesotho‘s geopolitical situation in 
which widespread corruption and elite capture of wealth prevents development aid from 
reaching the majority of the population (Ferguson, 1994; Tilt et al., 2008). The WB, 
playing a significant role in numerous development projects in Lesotho dating back to 
the 1970s, is a major focus of this criticism, viewing Lesotho “as a nation of farmers, not 
wage laborers; a country with geography, but no history; with people, but no classes; 
values, but no structures; administrators, but no rulers; bureaucracy, but no politics” 
(Ferguson, 1994: 66). Thus the political context of Lesotho, in which interests of 
entrenched elites possessing a disproportionate amount of wealth and power develop 
policies and execute programs to further accumulate capital, rather than benefit the 
impoverished majority, is largely ignored by leading development agencies. As we shall 
see, the LHWP is no exception to the multitude of development projects in Lesotho that 
have fallen prey to self-interested corrupt politicians at the expense of the poor. 
 
Historically victims of colonial exploitation and racial oppression, Basotho have 
experienced a tumultuous political history since the country gained independence from 
Britain in 1966. Lesotho has also been a historical underdog to South Africa, almost 
completely economically dependent on its neighbor. The division of costs and payment 
of royalties under the LHWP has been criticized as unfair to Lesotho, depriving this tiny 
country of its only abundant natural resource (Maema & Reynolds, 1995). While a 
significant proportion of the water delivered by the LHWP to South Africa is transferred 
to industrial firms, Basotho communities have been robbed of essential resources which 
are dependent on the natural flow of this water, to procure some level of livelihood. 
Citizens of Lesotho have engaged in multiple livelihood strategies for more than century, 
incorporating subsistence agriculture, miner remittances and small income generating 
projects (among other things) to provide for themselves and their families (Turner, 2001). 
The LHWP has made it that much more difficult for these mountain people to survive. 
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2.6THE LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT 
 
2.6.1 Overview 
 
The Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) is the second largest water infrastructure 
project being built in Africa today (Devitt & Hitchcock, 2010). This binational interbasin 
transfer scheme, involving the construction of five dams, more than 200 km of tunnels, 
two hydroelectric power plants, andover 265kilometers of access roads planned over 
the next 30 years, has the capacity to transfer 2,200 million cubic meters of water per 
year (the equivalent of one swimming pool (70 cubic meters) of water every second) 
from the Senqu River Basin in Lesotho to the Gauteng region of South Africa (LHDA, 
2002; Hoover, 2001). LHWP‘s two main objectives, outlined in the LHWP Treaty signed 
by the governments of South Africa and Lesotho in 1986, are the sale and delivery of 
water to Gauteng‘s industrial and private sectors and the domestic generation of 
electricity (180 MW capacity) in Lesotho (Willemse, 2007; LHDA, 2002). The total cost 
of the Project is estimated at US$8 billion (World Bank, 1991).  
 
Divided into four phases, the first phase of the LHWP is comprised of Phase 1A and 
Phase 1B. Phase 1A involved the construction and implementation of the Katse Dam (at 
the confluence of the Malibamats‘o and Bokong Rivers), Muela Dam, Muela 
Hydropower Station, and two transfer tunnels with a total length of 82 km. The largest 
curved dam and highest (at 2,000m above sea level) in Africa, the Katse dam is an 
185m high, 700m long double-curvature concrete arch dam with a 1,950 million cubed 
meter reservoir (LHDA, 2002). The total cost of Phase 1A was approximately R20 billion. 
Construction works for Phase 1A started in 1986, with wall construction beginning in 
1991. This first phase was completed in 1998.  
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Photo 2 : The Katse Dam wall. Katse Dam is the highest double curvature dam in Africa. 
 
 
Phase 1B consists of the Mohale Dam, built on the Senqunyane River, 37.6 km of 
transfer tunnels funneling water to the Katse Reservoir and a 72 MW hydropower 
station at Muela that connects with the Southern African Power Pool, generating all of 
Lesotho‘s electricity (LHDA, 1999). The total cost of Phase 1B was approximately R6.5 
billion (Mwangi, 2007). Construction for Phase 1B was begun in 1998 and completed in 
2004 (Devitt & Hitchcock, 2010). The governments of South Africa and Lesotho recently 
(just last year) signed the implementation agreement for Phase 2, which consists of the 
Polihali Reservoir on the Senqu River, the second hydropower station and a transfer 
tunnel to Katse dam estimated at a cost of R15 billion. Phase 2 is expected to be 
completed and operational by 2018 (Naidoo, 2011).  
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Photo 3 :Mohale Dam. 
 
LHWP‘s impact on the economy of Lesotho is significant, with project revenues 
estimated at 28 percent of the country‘s GDP. Direct contribution to the GDP includes 
water royalties paid by South Africa, customs revenues generated from large material 
imports and increased tax revenue, while indirect contributions include ancillary 
development such as roads, bridges, communication and urban infrastructure (Mwangi, 
2007). The contract for this multi-donor bilateral project runs from the completion of 
Phase 1A in 1995 to 2045 (Barrett & Senaoana, 1998).  
 
2.6.2 History of the LHWP 
 
Signed into being through the LHWP Treaty by two illegitimate non-democratic 
governments in January 1986, that of the National Party apartheid regime in South 
Africa and the military regime of General Justin Lekhanya in Lesotho, the LHWP is both 
one of the most comprehensive engineering projects of its kind in the world, while also 
one of the most contentious dam projects in recent history (Mwangi, 2007; Tilt et al., 
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2008). First conceived of in the 1950s while Lesotho was still under British colonial rule, 
several preliminaryfeasibility studies were conducted throughout the late 1960s, 1970s, 
and early 1980s (SAICE, 2002). However, due to political opposition from Lesotho‘s 
civilian government (which had resisted signing the Treaty for more than a decade), the 
transboundary water project did not get off the ground until the late 1980s (Matli, 2005).  
Claiming that the civilian government in Lesotho harbored and supported anti-apartheid 
fighters, the then apartheid South African government successfully supported General 
Justin Lekhanya‘s military coup in February 1986, thus removing all political obstacles in 
way of the Project (Matlosa, 1998). General Lekhanya‘s military regime (subsequently 
maintaining autocratic rule for the next 23 years) and the South African government 
hastily signed the LHWP Treaty on 24th October 1986 and the massive water transfer 
and hydropower project was set into motion (Rothert, 1999).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 4:1986 Treaty Signing by Foreign Ministers of Lesotho, 
Col. ThaabeLetsie (left) and South Africa, Mr. Pik Botha 
(right) in Maseru, Lesotho (SAICE, 2002). 
 
 
 
Thus the LHWP‘s birth was instigated by two oppressive military regimes that were 
undoubtedly interested in maintaining authoritarian rule rather than engaging in national 
development focused on poverty reduction. Apartheid South Africa was facing a serious 
economic crisis during this time due to political upheaval, persistent capital flight after 
the 1960s Sharpeville shootings and global economic sanctions. The apartheid 
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government desperately needed to rebuild foreign investor confidence in the country 
and required large amounts of water to fuel its industrial development, whereas the new 
military regime in Lesotho necessitated support of the apartheid government to maintain 
autocratic rule, thus the Project fulfilled both states‘ central objectives at that time (de 
Wet, 1999). While the LHWP faced ANC opposition throughout the 1980s as the Project 
amplified apartheid state power, the new democratic South African ANC government 
deemed the LHWP vital to its 1994 Reconstruction and Development Program and 
rapidly changed from an oppositional stance to one of collaboration (Matli, 2005). With 
the Project bringing in large amounts of revenueduring construction phases in the early 
and mid-1990s, Lesotho‘s poor economic situation forced the country to continue with 
the sale of its primary natural resource (Matlosa, 1998). 
 
As a historical underdog to South Africa, almost completely economically dependent on 
its neighbor, Lesotho accepted less than optimal terms in the Treaty, allowing South 
Africa rights to 40 percent of its water, what some have termed a ―reservoir of goodwill‖ 
(Qaddumi, 2008: 7; Tilt et al., 2008; Rothert, 1999). After extensive negotiations in 
which the two nation-states struggled to redirect costs of the Project back and forth to 
the other, it was decided that South Africa would finance all water transferinfrastructure, 
while Lesotho would pay for the hydroelectric component of the Project and cover 
compensation for socio-economic losses of PAP(SAICE, 2002). Many authors have 
criticized this outcome for its unfairness to Lesotho as all major infrastructure works 
would occur within its borders, thus a disproportionate share of costs of the Project 
would fall on Basotho shoulders (Maema and Reynolds, 1995). 
 
2.6.3 The LHWP Treaty 
 
 
Signed only a few months after the 1986 coup in Lesotho, the LHWP Treaty formally 
established a legal binding agreement between South Africa and Lesotho to proceed 
with the Project. The Treaty outlined set volumes of water to be delivered to South 
Africa annually, the basis for sharing costs of the Project, calculation of royalties to be 
paid to Lesotho and each country‘s respective requirements and responsibilities 
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concerning the LHWP (GoL, 1986b). In addition, the treaty clearly sets out provisions for 
waters released to rivers downstream of LHWP structures, stating: 
 
The LHDA should at all times maintain rates of flow in natural river channels 
immediately downstream of the Katse and Mohale dams not less than 500 and 
300 liters per second respectively and shall, if so required, release the quantities 
of water from either Katse or Mohale reservoirs as the case may be, necessary 
to maintain such rates of flow(GoL, 1986b).  
 
Such provisions for downstream water flows were established at a time when 
consideration of downstream impacts of large dams projects were almost completely 
neglected by dam planners and nation-states (Thamae & Pottinger, 2006; LHDA, 2002). 
Only in the past decade have the adverse environmental impacts of large-scale water 
projects on downstream communities gained attention, with few studies researching the 
impacts of changing natural flows of river patterns as they occur over long periods of 
time, are extremely complex and deemed costly by hydropower developers (Adams, 
2000). As the treaty calls for anastonishing 96 percent reduction in river flows downriver 
of Katse Dam, harmful impacts on downstream communities are significant, including 
contamination of water, loss of valuable vegetation, extinction of the Maluti Minnow and 
loss of drought relief coping mechanisms (LHDA, 2002; Hirji and Davis, 2009). The 570 
kilometers of rivers downstream of Katse and Mohale dams are home to 155,000 
Basotho suffering varying levels of environmental degradation due to reduced river 
flows (LHDA, 2002). Downstream impacts of the LHWP were not raised until 1995 by 
one of the first Panel of Expert‘s assessments (POE), an independent research group 
established by the WB to monitor the LHWP. The POE‘s dismal findings of severely 
degraded downstream river environments motivated the first Instream Flow 
Requirement Study to be undertaken two years later (Willemse, 2007).  
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Photo 5:Malimabast'o River downstream of Katse Dam. 
 
The most pertinent sections of the Treaty addressing PAP are found in Articles 7 and 15. 
Article 7(18:27) of the Treaty states: 
 
The LHDA shall effect all measures to ensure that members of the local 
communities in the Kingdom of Lesotho, who will be affected by flooding, 
construction works or similar project-related causes, will be able to maintain a 
standard of living not inferior to that obtaining at the time of the first disturbance, 
provided that such Authority shall effect compensation for any loss to such 
member as a result of such project-related causes not adequately met by such 
measures(GoL, 1986b). 
 
Similarly, Article 15 of the LHDA Order, of 1986 states the following: 
 
 
The Parties agree to take all reasonable measures to ensure that the 
implementation, operation and maintenance of the Project are compatible with 
the protection of the existing quality of the environment and, in particular, shall 
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pay due regard to the maintenance of the welfare of persons and communities 
immediately affected by the project(GoL, 1986a). 
 
The legal obligation to maintain PAPs‘ standards of livings before disruption by the 
Project almost exactly replicates WB guidelines for resettled and displaced populations 
(de Wet, 1999). Taking into account the impoverished state of most Basotho PAP 
before the LHWP came into their lives, such standards are contradictory to justifications 
for large-scale development projects proclaiming to benefit entire societies (especially 
those funded by the WB which has repeatedly reasserted its dedication to poverty 
reduction in the past two decades). However minimal such stipulations for maintaining 
standards of living of PAP may be, the legal rights of PAP affected by the LHWP have 
largely been disregarded (Devitt & Hitchcock, 2010).  
 
2.6.4 Management Structure of LHWP 
 
The Treaty also outlined terms for institutional arrangements to conduct LHWP 
operations. The LHDA Order of 1986 established the Lesotho Highlands Development 
Authority (LHDA), a parastatal charged with the responsibility ofsupervising engineering 
projects and maintenance of PAP standards of living including resettlement, 
compensation and economic development programs (GoL, 1986a). On the South 
African side, the Trans-Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA) was given the responsibility of 
managing water transfers in South Africa. Additionally, a binational body, the Joint 
Permanent Technical Commission (JPTC) (later renamed the Lesotho Highlands Water 
Commission (LHWC)) was established to supervise, monitor and approve activities 
undertaken by the LHDA and TCTA (Maema & Reynolds, 1995). The institutional 
structure of the LHDA is divided into four divisions including the Engineering Group, 
Commercial Services, Operation and Maintenance and the Environmental and Social 
Service Group (ESSG). Figure 1 on the following page describes the functions of each 
division. 
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Figure 1 : LHWP Management Structure  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institutional management of the LHWP was riddled with problems from the start. 
Consisting mostly of engineers and politicians, the technocratic orientation of all LHWP 
management structures translated into neglect of socio-economic concerns and 
development objectives at the expense of PAP. A WB report in 2007 found that the 
institutional relationship between the three bodies was ―cumbersome and slow‖ with the 
JPTC micro-managing LHDA and TCTA activities, especially ESSG endeavors involved 
in ensuring successful compensation, resettlement and maintenance of standards of 
living of PAP. Lack of accountability and lack of institutional capacity on the part of the 
LHDA resulted in delays in reaching and implementing decisions regarding 
compensation dispensation, resettlement and economic development programs. One 
WB report found that only 4 out of 12 senior LHDA official positions had been appointed 
(World Bank, 2007). After construction of Phase 1 was completed, restructuring of 
LHDA reduced management staff positions from 439 to 231, of which only 64 were 
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filledby April 2005. The WB reported that appointments to high-level positions within the 
LHDA were driven by political interests rather than sufficient qualification and 
experience (World Bank, 2007; Thamae & Pottinger, 2006). As Ferguson highlights, the 
―development apparatus in Lesotho is not a machine for eliminating poverty that is 
incidentally involved in state bureaucracy; it is a machine for reinforcing and expanding 
the exercise of bureaucratic state power‖ (Ferguson, 1994: 255). As guilty of other 
major WB funded projects in Lesotho, the LHWP major funder failed to take into 
account the geopolitically skewed context of the country, with inequality defining 
distribution of wealth and resources. 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 6: LHDA headquarters in Katse. 
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2.6.5 Socio-Economic Impacts 
 
While internationally renowned for its technological innovations, winning numerous 
engineering awards, the LHWP has likewise become internationally notorious for its 
devastating impacts on highland and downstream communities (Thamae & Pottinger, 
2006; Hoover 2001). Several studies researching the socio-economic impacts of the 
LHWP on PAP have confirmed that a substantial number of Basotho have suffered 
devastating consequences resulting from the Project. Phase 1A and 1B dispossessed 
more than 30,000 Basotho of their cropland and grazing land, a relatively small number 
compared to other large dams projects in the world, but highly significant for the 
Basotho population as the country suffers from overcrowding and exceptionally low 
percentages of productive land (Thamae & Pottinger, 2006; Hoover, 2001; Mwangi, 
2007). This first phase of the project submerged 1,500 ha of arable land, 1,900 ha of 
cropland and more than 5,000 ha of grazing land, exacerbating soil erosion and 
overgrazing as farmers were forced to cultivate on progressively steeper slopes and 
graze animals in increasingly smaller and condensed areas (Willemse, 2007; Mwangi, 
2007). The dispossession of this land had significant impacts on PAP standards of living 
as two-thirds of people in project areas rely on subsistence agriculture as one of many 
diversified livelihood strategies (Mwangi, 2007). The lack of direct supervision of 
construction companies by LHDA resulted in destruction of additional cropland as 
blasting activities threw large stones into fields and bypass roads created deep culverts 
filled with water destroying crops.In addition, other valuable resources used in 
sustaining livelihoods including trees, medicinal plants, wild vegetables, thatching grass, 
river sand and fish were lost due to the adverse environmental impacts of reduced river 
flows (Hoover, 2001).  
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Photo 7: The LHWP deprived Khohlo-Ntso of valuable grazing land,  
severely affected livestock health. 
 
With the influx of more than 20,000 migrants seeking employment in dam construction, 
community and family life in LHWP sites was considerably disrupted. Marital affairs 
between female local residents and construction workers became all too common, 
young school girls were bribed to engage in sexual relations with men working on the 
dam andHIV/AIDS infection rates skyrocketed in construction areas (Tilt et al., 2008; 
Hoover, 2001; HSRC, 2009). Originally LHDA provided ferryboat services to PAP to 
cross the reservoirs, but this transport service was considered too costly and shortly 
discontinued. Thus social ties between communities living on opposite sides of the 
reservoirs were interrupted as well as access to services such as clinics, schools and 
retail shops (Matli, 2005). Various studies reported increased incidences of stock theft, 
of great significance to PAP lives as the value of livestock in Lesotho holds as much or 
more weight culturally as their economic value (Hoover, 2001). With the most remote 
poorest regions of the country selected for construction, such destruction of livelihoods, 
social networks and health rendered life in these highland areas all the more difficult. A 
more extensive discussion of socio-economic impacts is provided at the end of this 
chapter. 
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2.6.6 World Bank and Other Financiers 
 
At the time of the Project‘s inception, economic sanctions against South Africa, resulting 
in de-investment of R15 billion between 1982-1984, prevented the country from 
receiving international funding. This was easily bypassed with Lesotho named as the 
primary borrower for Project loans (Rothert, 1999). Co-financed by the governments of 
Lesotho and South Africa, German, British and French bilateral aid,the WB, 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), European Investment Bank (EIB), the 
United Kingdom Commonwealth Development Corporation (UKCDC), African 
Development Bank (ADB), numerous private banks and Africa export credit-backed 
loans, the estimated cost of the LHWP is approximately US$8 billion (van Gelder et al., 
2002; Tricarico, 2000). By 2002, the Project had aggregate outstanding debt of R17,588 
million (US$1,552 million). Table 1on the following page presents an exact breakdown 
of LHWP financing. 
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Table 1 : A Breakdown of LHWP Financing (van Gelder et al., 2002) 
BANK COUNRTY AMOUNT (USD) 
 
African Development Bank International US$ 50.0 Million 
Foreign development agencies Various US$ 117.8 Million 
Commonwealth Development 
Corporation (now: CDC Capital 
Partners) 
United Kingdom US$ 36.1Million 
 
Development Bank of  
South Africa 
International US$ 241.0 Million 
European Development Fund International US$ 57.0Million 
 
EuropeanInvestment Bank International US$ 20.0Million 
 
United Nations Development 
Program 
International US$ 0.3 Million 
World Bank International US$ 110.0 Million 
Coface France US$ 104.0 Million 
ExportCredits 
GuaranteeDepartment 
United Kingdom US$ 82.0 Million 
HermessKreditversicherungs Germany US$ 118.0 Million 
SACCE South Africa US$ 107.0 Million 
BanqueNationale de Paris 
 (now part of BNP Paribas) 
France US$ 19.7 Million 
CréditLyonais France US$ 17.0 Million 
Hill Samuel (now part of Lloyds 
TSB) with CréditLyonais 
United Kingdom/ France US$ 14.5 Million 
Dresdner Bak 
(now part of Alianz) 
w rWiederaufbau 
Germany US$ 15.8 Million 
 
Development Bank of  
SouthernAfrica 
International US$ 47.0 Million 
 
EuropeanInvestment Bank International US$ 109.0 Million 
World Bank International US$ 45.0 Million 
 
 
The WB‘s involvement in the project was essential for bringing other funders on board. 
A 1991 WB Staff Appraisal report initially stated that environmental and social impacts 
of the LHWP would be minimal, estimating less than 16,000 Basotho would be directly 
impacted by the project (almost half of the actual numbers), excluding PAP affected by 
access roads and other ancillary project infrastructure. Listing local employment 
creation as one of the Project‘s central benefits, this report asserted that the LHWP was 
essential for improving Lesotho‘s economic prospects and bringing the country‘s 
domestic absorption under control (World Bank, 1991). The WB named the entire 
population of Lesotho (with emphasis on poverty-stricken Basotho), industrial and urban 
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water users in the Gauteng region of South Africa, Basotho contractors, LHDA 
employees, project construction workers and highland communities as the main 
beneficiaries of the LHWP (World Bank, 2007). Despite the WB‘s assertion that the 
Project established productive long-term employment prospects in Lesotho, a meager 
3,000 Basotho were employed by the project, most of whom found jobs as lowly-paid 
laborers with most skilled positions filled by country foreigners (Matli, 2005).  
 
WB reasoning for support of the LHWP falls in line with an ideological insistence on the 
part of megaproject development proponents that massive development projects have 
trickle-down effects that improve local populations‘ qualities of life. Thamae & Pottinger 
(2006) describe such attitudes as part of an “institutional culture…built on incentives to 
make loans and keep disbursements flowing rather than achieving actual sustainable 
development” (Thamae & Pottinger, 2006: 37).  
 
2.6.7 Royalties 
 
One of the major economic benefits of the LHWP to Lesotho is the payment of water 
royalties for a period of 50 years (LHDA, 1999). LHWP water royalties are comprised of 
two components, namely a fixed component which is paid monthly and calculated on 
the basis of amounts of water transferred to South Africa, and a variable component 
which depends on the difference of electricity costs attributable to pumping operations 
and to operation and maintenance of the alternative projects (Mokorosi, 2007). While 
initially assessed that royalty payments would reach estimates of US$55 million per 
year, in actuality Lesotho has received an average of US$18 million annually. Lower 
values are attributed to extended droughts occurring in Lesotho in which water levels 
are much lower than were originally assumed (Tilt et al., 2008). By the end of 2006, 
Lesotho had received R1,918 million in royalty payments (World Bank, 2007). Table 
2and Table 3 below present royalty payments to Lesotho from 1996 to 2004 and 
amounts of water delivered to South Africa, respectively.1 
                                                        
1Though data for more recent years was requested from LHDA in this study, no data was provided and 
no public data is available. 
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Table 2 :LHWP Water Deliveries and Royalty Revenue (LHDA, 2005) 
 
Year Water Deliveries 
 (million cubic meters) 
Royalty Payments 
Million Maluti 
 
1996 (Nov-Dec) - M130.50 
1997 - M81.83 
1998 439 M129.20 
1999 540 M146.93 
2000 570 M153.24 
2001 587 M174.80 
2002 611 M210.50 
2003 652 M204.73 
2004 661 M220.98 
 
Delivery to date: 4062.04 Million cubic meters 
Revenue to date: M1,452,620,227.32 
 
Table 3 : LHWP Electricity Generation and Sales Revenue (LHDA, 2005) 
 
Financial 
Year 
Total 
Planned 
Generation 
(GWhrs) 
 
Total 
Actual 
production 
(GWhrs) 
‗Muela 
Peak 
Output 
(MW) 
Electricity 
Sales to 
LEC 
(Million 
Maluti) 
Export 
Energy 
(GWhrs) 
Export 
Revenue 
(Million 
Maluti) 
2000/01 387 371.57 78.1 M44.13 - - 
2001/02 391 372.95 77.7 M44.76 23.22 M44.13 
2002/03 389 377.93 78.5 M43.25 35.32 M44.76 
2003/04 436 428.79 77.9 M48.69 40.28 M43.25 
 
 
As will be discussed in the following chapter, a significant percentage of these royalty 
payments were designated for the LHWP benefit sharing mechanism incorporated into 
the project for purposes of economic and social development. This study aimed to 
explore whether such funds had reached the village of Khohlo-Ntso and what their 
experiences were with projects initiated under the Lesotho Highlands Revenue Fund 
(LHRF). 
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2.7 OTHER LHWP STUDIES 
 
Numerous studies have been conducted by sociologists researching the impacts of the 
LHWP on project-affected Basotho communities. Focuses of these studies include the 
micro and macro-economic, socio-cultural and health impacts of the Project, LHWP DID, 
participation of PAP in decision-making processes of compensation and resettlement 
procedures, usefulness of SIAs in assessing impacts of the LHWP, resettlement 
experience of PAP and assessment of the Treaty‘s requirements for maintenance of 
standards of living (Makuta, 1991; Maema & Reynolds, 1995; LHDA, 1995; Archer, 
1996; Barrett &Senoana, 1998; Matlosa, 1998; Tricarico, 2000; Hoover, 2001;Sakoane, 
2001; LHDA, 2002, Akindele&Senyane, 2004; Matli, 2005; Thamae & Pottinger, 2006; 
Willemse, 2007; Tilt et al., 2008; Slater &Mphale, 2009; HSRC, 2009; Devitt & Hitchcock, 
2010; Braun, 2005, 2010). This research has been fundamental in documenting 
adverse impacts of LHWP on Basotho communities and influencing mitigation policies. 
 
2.7.1 LHWP DIDR 
 
The LHWP directly displaced more than 30,000 Basotho from their homes and lands 
(Mwangi, 2007). Maema & Reynolds (1995) reported that project planners 
underestimated numbers of displaced by 600 percent.To this day, no EIA has been 
conducted for PAP affected by Phase 1A construction and implementation, thus Phase 
1A PAP (including residents of Khohlo-Ntso, the dam-affected community under study) 
are considered the worst off of all LHWP affected communities (Matli, 2005). Thamae & 
Pottinger (2006) found that 27,000 people experienced direct and indirect displacement 
in Phase 1A. While the first houses and lands were acquired by the Project in 1987, 
compensation for such losses had still not occurred by 1989. Braun (2005) 
substantiated this finding, reporting that a few months before the Katse Reservoir was 
planned to be filled, no houses for the 71 families displaced by submerged lands had 
been built, thus LHDA engaged in hasty construction of resettled houses resulting in 
poor quality infrastructure which rapidly became dilapidated. Scudder (2005) reported 
that in Phase 1A, 1,100 highlands residents lost parts of theirfields, of which 365 local 
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residents were left with no fields at all. Overcrowding of already scarce cropland and 
grazing land was exacerbated, and more than 400 sharecroppers in Phase 1A were left 
with little to no means of subsistence production (Thamae & Pottinger, 2006). 
 
An LHDA Resettlement and Development study in 1995 reported that ventilated pit 
latrines, provided to only a small proportion of resettled PAPs, were poorly constructed 
and had deteriorated after only a few years (LHDA, 1995). Devitt & Hitchcock (2010) 
found that after dismal POE reports and widespread criticism compelled LHDA to 
revamp their resettlement and compensation policy, participants of the study reported a 
much improved resettlement experience in Phase 1B (including communities affected 
by the construction of Mohale Dam), with more choices of what kind of houses they 
wanted, preferences of what areas of the country to resettle and kinds of compensation 
they wanted to receive. However, the study also found that participants reported more 
frequent food shortages and unquantifiable social, spiritual and personal losses. 
 
 
 
Photo 8:A ventilated pit latrine constructed by LHDA in Khohlo-Ntso 
 in the early to mid-1990s, remnants of the water sanitation project  
under the LHRF. 
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2.7.2 Health Impacts 
 
Studies found that one of the most severe adverse impacts of the LHWP was on the 
health of PAP, affecting nutritional levels, increasing rates of HIV/AIDS and other STDs 
and drastically reducing PAPs‘ abilities to meet their nutritional needs. One HSRC 
(2009) study found that while the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in dam areas was only 1 
percent in 1993, this number had risen to 24 per cent by 2006. Similarly, Thamae & 
Pottinger (2006) reported a 0.5 percent infection rate of local residents living within a 5 
km radius of Katse Dam, yet antenatal tests ofpregnant women at Katse Clinic in 1999 
showed that 22 percent were positive. Makuta (1991), LHDA (1999), Matli (2005) and 
Tilt et al. (2008) further substantiated these findings, with research recounting significant 
increase in sex work, HIV/AIDs and other STDs and exposure to violence and stigma 
associated with these diseases. Inadequate nutritional levels due to loss of essential 
resources (discussed in the next section) exacerbated adverse health impacts, 
especially with Lesotho facing major food shortages in the past decade due to 
elongated droughts (Pottinger, 2007). LHDA handled the negative health impacts poorly, 
with agriculture and health care programs considerably underfunded under the LHRF 
(Tilt et al., 2008). Braun (2010) found that the health of women was especially 
negatively affected. 
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Photo 9: Child malnutrition is a major health problem in the areas surrounding 
 Katse Dam. Loss of fields and other natural resources acquired for the project  
has drasticallyexacerbated undernourishment in Khohlo-Ntso. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.7.3 Livelihood Impacts 
 
With 60 percent of households in the Katse and Muela areas falling below the national 
average income and ranked as ―very poor‖ at the beginning of Phase 1A construction, 
LHWP impacts on livelihoods rendered already impoverished communities completely 
destitute(Sechaba Consultants, 2000; Tshabala& Turner, 1989; Hoover, 2001). Not only 
 
 
59  
did PAP communities lose fields to dam infrastructure and access roads, but side spoil 
from blasting activities also ruined many fields (Matlosa, 1998; Hoover, 2001; Tricarico, 
2000). Leaving 25 percent of PAP landless, and many more sharecroppers without 
means of production, the two most important forms of life sustenance for people living in 
project areas, namely livestock and arable land, came under serious peril (Matli, 2005; 
Tricarico, 2000). Periods of construction in project areas provided some means of 
replacing these essential components of Basotho livelihood, with 20,600 people moving 
to the Katse area in the early to mid-1990s to work on the dam. These migrant workers 
provided a customer base for various businesses including joalengs (shebeens), rental 
of living quarters and sale of makoenya (fat cakes) and other food goods (Matli, 2005). 
However, businesses faltered with the exodus of migrant workers, further exacerbating 
difficulties in sustaining livelihoods. Very few local residents found formal work with the 
LHWP, thus already dire unemployment rates increased with the completion of Katse 
Dam (Tilt et al., 2008; Hoover, 2001). As early as 1991, one study reported that due to 
the paving of roads allowing greater access to the lowlands and the increased customer 
base, prices of essential goods rose substantially during construction periods (Makuta, 
1991).  
 
In the 2001 Hoover study, 40 percent of PAP reported a significant decrease in 
medicinal plants while 10 percent of the study participants said they had stopped using 
the herbs altogether. At least 175 medicinal plants grew in the submerged zones and 
served as valuable sources of income as they were often sold tosangomas(traditional 
doctors) in the lowlands. The study also reported decreases in thatching grass, river 
sand and fuel sources. Submerged lands in the Katse area had contained renewable 
resources valued at approximately US$146, now rendered completely unavailable to 
local communities. 
 
With most highlands incomes falling below US$320 per year, Hoover (2001) estimated 
that some 45 percent of annual household income is now used to replace lost natural 
resources. Additionally, a significant proportion of participants in various studies 
reported increases in stock theft (Hoover, 2001). One other major source of livelihood 
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lost to PAP was income generated from sale of matekoane (marijuana), which grows 
wild in the Lesotho highlands and is an important source of cash income for many 
families, paying for school fees, transport and other goods and services requiring a cash 
income (Devitt & Hitchcock, 2010). 
 
 
Table 4: Estimated Values of Resources Harvested From Senqu Riparian Zones 
(Hoover, 2001) 
 
 Percent of 
Households 
That 
Harvested 
Resources 
Average 
Amount 
Collected 
Annually per 
House 
Market Value 
per Unit 
 (USD) 
Annual Cost 
of Resource 
Loss per 
Household 
(USD) 
Willow Trees 22.7% 5.5 trees $4.82 $26.51 
Poplar Trees 22.7% 14.6 trees $2.68 $39.13 
Woody shrubs 47% 190 bundles $1.12 $212.80 
Wild vegetables 43.1% 148 bags $0.35 $51.80 
Medicinal plants 19.8% N/A N/A $8.02 
Thatch grass 24.7% 6.5 bundles $1.22 $7.93 
Craft grass 
(Leola) 
17.0% 4.2 bundles $2.02 $8.48 
River sand 9.2% N/A N/A $63.98 
Average Annual Cost of Total Resource Loss per Household $146.00 
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Photo 10:The Khohlo-Ntso River, which runs downstream of Katse Dam.  
Catchment of water in Katse Dam has resulted in extremely 
 low levels of water in the river. 
 
 
2.7.4 Cultural Impacts 
 
Cultural impacts of the LHWP on PAP communities have also been severe. Studies 
have documented an increase in extra-marital affairs as the Project necessitated 
massive influxes of male immigrants to work on construction sites (Tilt et al., 2008; Matli, 
2005). With the Katse High School located only a few kilometers from the dam, school 
girls were forced to walk past construction sites and often lured into sexual relations 
with male workers in possession of cash incomes (enticing female students with cell 
phones and other material teenage wants). Authors have reported destruction of family 
and community unity due to conflicts over new cash incomes brought by the project 
(Matli, 2005). Other studies have pointed to increased inequality as some local 
residents received cash compensation, new houses or found employment at dam sites, 
while others did enjoy such benefits, creating labour hierarchies among communities 
(Matli, 2005; Tilt et al., 2008). During Katse Dam construction and implementation, 
a―gated foreign suburban community‖,the Katse Village, was established, consisting of 
residences for LHDA workers originating from the lowland areas and the Katse Lodge, 
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which prevents local residents from entering freely (Hoover, 2001:). Houses in Katse 
Village have electricity and modern plumbing, while the villages surrounding the 
community go without.  
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 11:The entrance to Katse Village, a gated suburban community established by LHDA 
 to house LHDA employees and to host tourists at Katse Lodge. Local residents are required togive 
reasons for entering Katse village and to sign in before gaining entry. The village seen behind the gate 
still goes without electricity or running water after almost a quarter century of LHWP development. 
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2.8.1 Justifications for Benefit Sharing 
 
One of the most recent developments within large dam development is that of benefit 
sharing (Paiement, 2007). As dam opponents commonly highlight, costs and benefits of 
large water transfer and hydropower projects are most frequently distributed unevenly. 
The winners of such projects are urban water users and large powerful organizations 
such as international financial institutions, governments, private or state owned electric 
companies, mining and other major corporations, construction contractors and 
equipment producers. The losers are most often marginalized groups living in rural 
areas hosting large dam sites and communities downstream of dams. The winners earn 
substantial amounts of profits from large dam projects while the majority of losers are 
further impoverished, bearing a disproportionate share of the costs (WCD, 2000). 
Undeniable evidence of the unequal distribution of costs and benefits of large dams has 
spurned much opposition to this form of megaproject development. Growing consensus 
has emerged that compensation is inefficient to balance the scale and thus, more 
drastic measures should be taken to ensure that local stakeholders are primary 
beneficiaries of large dam development (Milewski et al., 1999; Cernea, 2008). Benefit 
sharing provides one innovative way for this to happen. 
 
Defined as ―a direct monetary redistribution of project-related revenues or profits to 
project-affected populations, associated with the existence of an economic rent‖, benefit 
sharing is based on the principle of equity, which the third main debate about social 
impacts of large dams revolves around (Egre et al., 2002: 2). Adams (2000) discusses 
three axes of the equity debate (or the ways in which positive and negative impacts of 
large dams are distributed) including the balance sheet approach of cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) commonly used by large dam developers to assess whether to build 
dams, the question of whether losers also enjoy benefits and thirdly, comparison of how 
costs are dispersed between different groups both spatially and temporally. Thus benefit 
sharing mechanisms potentially provide a resolution to the equity debate as they 
provide arrangements that ensure those who lose out also reap the benefits. Three 
main arguments can be made for benefit sharing, namely the economic rationale, the 
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ethical rationale and the development rationale (Egre et al., 2002). The first is based 
upon the theory of economic rent in which, as outlined by Rothman (2000),  
 
the exploitation of natural resources, including water resources, can generate 
significant economic rent- a surplus return over and above the value of the 
capital, labour, materials and other factors of production employed to exploit the 
resource…Surplus means that the return is more than what the factor could earn 
in its best occupation. In other words, the return is greater than needed to keep 
the factor in that use or a reward in excess of that required to bring forth a 
desired effort or function…Therefore developers do not “earn” rent as they do 
normal profits (i.e. return to the capital and entrepreneurship). Rather, rent is a 
windfall created by the bounty of Nature (Rothman, 2000: 13). 
 
Thus the first argument justifying benefit sharing is concerned with the notion that 
substantial amounts of revenue generated by large dams can be shared by dam owners 
with multiple groups of PAP. The second argument for benefit sharing is positioned 
within ethical considerations of large dam development. While proponents of the 
―national best interest‖ developmentalism argument (discussed in the first section of this 
chapter) believe that economic development must come at some sacrifice to individual 
interests of communities for well-being of entire populations, opponents of such 
justificationaccuse―national best interest‖ positions as morally repugnant, employed by 
elites of the world to defend their exploitation of public resources for self-serving capital 
accumulation (Penz, 1997).  
 
The second justification for benefit sharing recognizes that large dams transfer water 
resources to distant locations, depriving local populations of a natural resource that they 
have used and shared for time immemorial, thus the assertion that these communities 
should share in the benefits generated by the resource they have been forced to 
sacrifice. Cernea (2008) highlights that while securing economic rents and returning 
them to the general public has been practiced for many years, the novelty of benefit 
sharing lies in its ―enactment of the priority entitlement of a special sub-group of the 
public…to an earmarked amount‖ (Cernea, 2008: 99). 
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The third argument for benefit sharing embraces the view of large-scale water transfer 
and hydroelectric projects as means of developing poorer regions and countries in the 
world. Here large dams are seen as having significant development potential for local 
populations who can benefit from regional economic development plans funded by 
revenues generated by such massive infrastructure projects (Egre et al., 2002). As we 
shall see, this is the form that benefit sharing was intended to take in the LHWP. 
 
2.8.2 Types of Benefit Sharing Mechanisms 
 
Milewski et al. (1999) outline four kinds of benefit sharing mechanisms, namely 
preferential electricity rates, property taxes, revenue sharing and equity sharing or full 
ownership. While preferential electricity rates involve agreements in which local or 
regional populations receive discounted or free power from hydroelectric producers, the 
second mechanism, property taxes, allow local or regional governments to collect taxes 
from owners and operators of plants on the land hosting hydropower infrastructure. The 
third mechanism, revenue sharing, allocates a certain percentage of water royalties to 
local or regional authorities. The last benefit sharing mechanism (and the most radical) 
is equity sharing or full ownership, in which local or regional governments have partial or 
full ownership of the hydropower facility, sharing both the benefits and risks of the 
project. While Milewski et al. (1999) considered only hydropower projects in identifying 
the above benefit sharing mechanisms, their work was expandedupon a few years later 
by Egre et al. (2002) to include all large-scale water transfer projects. Additionally, the 
latter study added development funds as a fifth benefit sharing mechanism. 
Development funds use revenues generated by large dam projects to foster economic 
development including training and capacity building programs, job creation, community 
infrastructure and funding for education i.e. the LHWP LHRF. 
 
White et al. (2008) use a different method to classify benefit sharing mechanisms, 
finding five ways in which benefits of large-scale water projects can be fairly distributed. 
The four classifications include compensation for lost assets or loss of access to 
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resources, restoration and enhancement of livelihoods, community development and 
basin development. Though White et al.‘s (2008) system of classification may be useful 
for other research on benefit sharing, this study uses Egre et al.‘s (2002) different kinds 
of benefit sharing as they include development funds, which is the primary benefit 
sharing mechanism assessed in this research. 
 
2.8.3 International Experiences with Benefit Sharing 
 
Of the relatively small amount of literature available regarding benefit sharing in large-
scale water projects, a handful of studies have provided analyses of international 
experiences with benefit sharing schemes (Milewski et al., 1999; Adams, 2000; Egre et 
al., 2002; Egre, 2007; Cernea, 2008; Paiement, 2007; Dagou & Mamina, 2009). These 
studies evaluated different benefit sharing mechanisms employed in 9 hydropower 
projects located in different countries around the world, namely Columbia, Brazil, 
Panama, China, Japan, Canada, Norway, Ghana, and Lesotho. While some studies 
limited their approach to summary reviews describing different forms of benefit sharing 
mechanisms employed in various countries, others presented comparative analyses of 
various countries‘ experiences with benefit sharing.  
 
Main conclusions of the research cited above included the now widespread evidence 
that cash compensation was insufficient to restore PAP livelihoods and that benefit 
sharing mechanisms should be implemented in large dam projects to complement 
compensation (Cernea, 2008). They further found that the success of such schemes is 
highly dependent on government organizations‘ institutional capacity and transparency 
(Egre et al., 2002). Additionally, benefit sharing is an excellent means for developers to 
establish cooperative partnerships with local communities in areas surrounding dams 
and hydropower projects in remote areas that have little access to investment in 
infrastructure and services must be compelled to incorporate benefit sharing schemes 
as important means of livelihoods are frequently destroyed by such projects (Milewski et 
al, 1999). A brief summary of the assorted forms of benefit sharing employed in different 
hydroelectric projects is provided below. 
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Columbia 
The National Law 99 passed by the Columbian government in 1993, applicable to all 
hydroelectric plants of 10 MW or more, obligated power producers to share project 
revenues with local watershed agencies and authorities. This legislation was followed 
by Decree 1933, which stated that 3 percent of revenues should be transferred to both 
upstream municipalities and those located next to the reservoir. A few years later, 
National Law No. 99 established an ―Environmental Compensation Fund‖, increasing 
these percentages to 20 percent of project revenues. Directly displacing 5,800 people 
due to acquisition of 15,000 ha, the Urra 1 hydroelectric project is thus required to 
transfer 3 percent of profits to the local watershed management agency 
CoporacionAutonoma Regional del San Jorge. Most of the revenues transferred are 
allocated to water, sanitation and environmental conservation projects, with no specific 
requirements for funds to subsidize social and economic development projects 
(Milewski et al., 1999). The hydroelectric project is located in an area fraught with 
problems including severe environmental degradation, armed conflict and a great influx 
of immigrant settlement. Despite the involvement of one municipality and one watershed 
agency dealing with transferred revenues (one main prerequisite for successful benefit 
sharing identified by researchers), and legislative requirements that public accounts of 
transfers must be available, lack of transparency and lack of accountability have 
resulted in little improvement of PAP welfare living in the area (Paiement, 2007).  
 
Brazil 
As with the LHWP, the Itaipu hydropower plant is a binational initiative supplying 
Paraguay with 25 percent and Brazil with almost all of the respective countries‘ 
electricity requirements (Milewski et al., 1999).  Due to multiple reservoirs involved in 
the project, indigenous local communities across both countries were displaced and 
faced severe impoverishment from the 1980s on. Four federal laws were promulgated 
within 12 years after project completion including Brazilian Law 8001 of 1990, which 
specifies that a striking 98 percent of all revenues generated by hydropower plants in 
Brazil be transferred to national and local authorities. Legislation mandates that 
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transferred revenues be divided in the following way: 40 percent allocated to 
maintenance of electrical infrastructure, 35 percent to water resources management 
and monitoring and a minimum of 25 percent dedicated to environmental protection 
(Cernea, 2008).  
 
With 45 percent of profits allocated to municipalities that have lost land due to the 
project, Itaipu generates more than US$75 million for 16 local governments annually, 
totaling $989 million since 1991 (Adams, 2000). The hydropower project also has its 
own large-scale environment and social development program that engages in various 
endeavors to improve PAP standards of living including reforestation, public health, 
reservoir fisheries and environmental monitoring  (Milewski et al., 1999). The few 
studies assessing effectiveness of the above Brazilian legislation on improving PAP 
welfare have found that the designated transfers of revenues are taking place and 
drastically improving livelihoods in impoundment zones and surrounding areas. 
However, downstream PAP impacted by the massive hydropower project do not receive 
assistance (Milewski, 1999; Egre et al., 2008).  
 
Panama 
The Bayano Dam in Panama was envisioned with analogous regional and economic 
development objectives as the Itaipu project, however, while the Brazilian government 
has taken serious initiative to address adverse social impacts of its massive 
hydroelectric project, the situation faced by PAP in Panama is much more dire. Despite 
environmental laws promulgated in 1998 compelling resource developers to involve 
PAP in negotiations for compensation and benefit sharing arrangements, agencies in 
charge of project management have largely ignored legislation, PAP received no 
compensation andthey have been excluded from decision-making processes. After 
being removed from their fertile lands possessing much biodiversity and resources to 
sustain livelihoods, PAP resettled in polluted lands unsuitable for human habitation. 
Thus Paiement (2007) writes, ―Bayano has become synonymous for all the evils of 
mega-dams and the excesses of multi-lateral financed development projects in the 
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Third World (i.e. financial debt, social conflict, ecological damage, cultural change, etc.)‖ 
(Paiement, 2007: 9). 
 
Canada 
One of the most infamous large-scale water projects across the world, the James Bay 
hydroelectric project, involving the construction of more than 20 large dams, would have 
upset the entire tribal Cree Indian population from their homelands. However, after 
repeatedly holding organized protests and taking legal action, the Cree prevented 
HyroQuebec (Canada‘s main power company) from completing construction, thus 
setting the stage for successive Canadian legislation concerning large dam 
development (Scudder, 2005). The government utility established a partnership strategy 
with local communities centered around the idea of equity sharing, indicating that due to 
donation of lands and development potential attached to such resources, local native 
populations are also considered partial owners or investors in the project and thus shall 
receive a proportionate amount of project revenues (Milewski et al., 1999; Cernea, 
2008). The ―Pais des Braves‖ agreement between the Cree Nation and Government of 
Quebec compels HydroQuebec to pay the Cree US$70 million annually over a period of 
50 years (total costs of hydroelectric projects undertaken are estimated at US$4 billion) 
(Paiement, 2007). Held up as one of the few examples of ―international best practice‖ 
for large-scale water development for once translated into reality, the massive Canadian 
hydroelectric project provides a variety of options to Cree communities for receiving 
revenues and allows for extension of the agreement for another 49 year within the set 
period of 50 years (Milewski et al., 1999).  
 
Norway 
A world leader in hydropower equitable benefit sharing, Norway had established 
mechanisms for distribution of large dam projects as earlier as 1917. Current national 
legislation provides for environmental and social safeguards, rules for management and 
operation of dams and licensing requirements. The Glomma-Lagen Water management 
authority is responsible for operation and management of 40 reservoirs and 51 
hydropower stations. Largely distributing hydropower revenues to local counties and 
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municipalities through taxation mechanisms, more than 80 percent of revenues had 
been returned to regions hosting major project infrastructure by 1998 (Paiement, 2007). 
Norway‘s 1997 ―Power Taxation Act‖ entitles PAP regions throughout the country to 
three forms of tax revenue. These include a 28 percent taxation on all hydropower 
companies‘ profits distributed equally to national and local governments, a 0.7 percent 
property tax to local communities where companies are located and finally, a tax on 
natural resource exploitation which is also distributed evenly to local and national 
governments. Additionally, legislation compels hydroelectric firms to provide (at their 
own cost), a 10 percent proportion of electricity generated to their local municipality, a 
form of in-kind benefit sharing (Cernea, 2008). Thus Norway practices one of the most 
progressive hydropower benefit sharing programs globally. 
 
Japan 
Benefit sharing mechanisms take a different form in Japanese hydropower projects than 
anywhere else in the world. Attempting to resolve tensions between the country‘s 
necessity for domestic hydropower generation and meeting relocated populations‘ 
needs, Japan has enacted land-lease agreements in which PAP receive two kinds of 
payments, namely one up-front payment to landowners leasing the reservoir to national 
power firms and secondly, regular rent disbursements for the entire life of the project. 
Thus, the lost land, now immersed by water used to generate electricity, remains a 
constant source of livelihood support for displaced peoples. Such an approach has 
proved extremely effective in mitigating the risks of resettlement (Cernea, 2008). 
However, as with most of the other projects described above (with the exception of 
Norway and Canada), the welfare of downstream communities facing environmental 
degradation and loss of important resources is not addressed.  
 
 
 
 
2.8.4 Benefit Sharing in the LHWP: The Lesotho Highlands Revenue Fund 
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Required by the WB as a poverty alleviation component of the Project as well as to 
supplement compensation for lost assets and resources, the Lesotho Highlands 
Revenue Fund (LHRF) was created in 1991 with objectives of poverty alleviation 
through income generating projects and other rural development programs (World Bank, 
2007). Forty percent of total LHWP royalties were supposed to be allocated to the Fund. 
The program included projects involving animal husbandry, range management, 
mountain horticulture, field crops, community forestry, commercial trout ventures, youth 
development, tourism, rural training programs, community water supply, rural access 
roads, sanitation and rural electrification. After prolonged conflicts between the 
governments of South Africa and Lesotho concerning who should be responsible for 
funding the program, an agreement was made that the two governments would split the 
costs evenly, each paying US$18 million over a ten year period. This amount was far 
below the amount of  US$54 million initially projected for the program (Hoover, 2001; 
Devitt & Hitchcock, 2010; POE, 1995). Similar to the compensation and resettlement 
programs, LHRF programs were poorly implemented and riddled with problems from the 
outset. As early as 1995 (only two years after the project got off the ground), the 
program was highly criticized for its lack of capacity to effectively implement projects, 
spending only 3 percent of its annual budget (Devitt & Hitchcock, 2010).  
 
After two successive POE reports in 1995 and 1997 found that successes of projects 
were exaggerated by LHDA on paper, that high levels of corruption existed in which 
money went into politicians pockets rather than contribute to socio-economic 
development and, finally, that most projects failed to raise Basotho standards of living, 
the WB called for a special audit of the Fund, subsequently insisting that the LHRF be 
restructured (POE, 2006; Matlosa, 1998). Reformulated into the Lesotho Fund for 
Community Development (LFCD) in 1998, the LHRF successor established an 
additional component to the program aimed at providing communal compensation to 
upstream and downstream communities directly impacted by the LHWP (World Bank, 
2010). Thus, the LHWP became the first large dam project to compensate villages 
located outside of construction sites (Khotle& Caswell, 2004). The LHWC approved 
recruitment of a four person Technical Assistance Unit (two in Katse and two in Mohale) 
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to assist PAP communities in developing cooperatives and business plans, which would 
then allow these Local Legal Entities (LLEs) to access communal compensation funds. 
Between 2001 and 2002, 43 villages in Katse and Mohale were trained to form LLEs, 
but Technical Assistants were not hired until 2005 (Thamae & Pottinger, 2006). Again, 
funds allocated for Technical Assistant training were underutilized, with only R392 
million of the R600 million loan disbursement spent (World Bank, 2007).  
 
A recent WB report (2010) found that the LFCD suffered the same problems 
experienced by its predecessor and ranked the new program the least successful 
element of the LHWP. Rather than contribute to poverty alleviation, LFCD funds had 
again been subject to elite capture, with ―parliamentarians…given license to select 
projects to fit their own constituency interests and royalties were used to finance 
politically chosen and non-participatory investments…thus the original purpose of the 
project was lost‖ (World Bank, 2010: xi). The document also reported that no monitoring 
and evaluation program had been established and data collection on existing projects 
was absent. Furthermore, the training program to enhance LHDA staff capacity, which 
had been planned to begin in 1998, was still not in existence in 2001. The report 
concluded, ―in effect, the funds could have been used, without any monitoring, for any 
purpose whatsoever‖ (World Bank, 2010: 9).  
 
As described in the previous chapter, the Lesotho Fund for Community Development 
(LFCD) (the successor of the Lesotho Highlands Revenue Fund (LHRF)), falls under 
Egre et al.‘s (2002) fifth classification of benefit sharing mechanisms, namely 
development funds. 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE:METHODOLOGY 
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3.1 RESARCH STUDY OVERVIEW 
 
This chapter describes the study‘s research design, data collection techniques, 
sampling techniques, description of the area studied, data processing techniques and 
constraints.The research for this study was conducted from June to December of 2011. 
A desktop study of relevant literature and primary documents was undertaken 
throughout the study, while three field visits with a duration of ten days each occurred 
during the last three months of 2011. As the study aimed to ascertain the local 
residents‘experiences with benefit sharing within the LHWP,a qualitative single-case 
study design was chosen to provide a holistic in-depth investigation of such internal 
perceptions.  
 
 
3.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Qualitative research explores human behavior and social phenomena that cannot easily 
be predicted, quantified, or assumed beforehand (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). It 
contextualizes interactions within local settings, enabling a deeper understanding of 
human behavior in relation to the historical, social, economic, and political environment 
in which they are manifested (Strauss& Corbin, 1990). Yin (1993) outlines three 
different types of qualitative studies, namely exploratory which explores the ―what‖ 
questions of phenomenon, explanatory which examines the ―why‖ questions of a 
research topic and descriptive which develops a descriptive social theory. As this study 
focuses on ―what‖ questions including what local residents‘ experiences were with 
benefit sharing within the LHWP, what they know about the LHRF, what changed in 
their lives due to their proximity to the Katse Dam, what were their general feelings 
about the Project and what developmentsresulting from LHWP they felt could improve 
the quality of their lives, an exploratory single-case design was used to gain an in-depth 
look at one downstream community‘s experience with benefit sharing under the LHWP.  
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While exploratory studies have the disadvantage of rudimentary findings and lack 
representativeness, they are particularly useful in researching experiences or 
phenomenon not previously understood and incremental in providing guidance for future 
research in the area (Yin, 1993). An exploratory single-case study design was the 
optimum choice for this study as most studies concerning the impact of large dam 
development have focused on displaced and resettled affected communities with very 
few reporting on the realities and perceptions of downstream communities.  
 
Examples of qualitative methods include ethnography, action research and case study. 
Utilization of the qualitative case study in this research has not only provided detailed 
knowledge of the issues at hand, but has also helped to trace the history of the LHWP, 
the lifestyles and livelihoods of community members before and after project 
implementation, identify and examinelocal residents‘ attitudes about the LHWP and 
discover what participants believe to be the way forward (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). As 
Strauss and Corbin (1990) highlight, this kind of qualitative case study research can 
then be used to develop future LHWP and other megaproject policies, evaluate current 
LHWP and other dam programs experience with benefit sharing, and add to basic 
knowledge about megaproject development. 
 
A qualitative case study research design enables the researcher to capture a detailed 
account of the internal experiences of study participants as well as the complexity and 
context in which people‘s social location in the world affects their perception and 
description of experiences (Temple & Edwards, 2002). While the qualitative case study 
technique has been criticized for lack of generalizability, its strengths lie in the ability to 
provide valuable insights into the experiences of dam-affected communities and what 
members of such communities believe concerning how dam projects can be utilized to 
improve qualities of their lives. As de Vaus (2001) explains, this type of exploratory 
research attempts to make sense of observations which may ultimatelycontribute 
togeneration of theoryconcerning large dam projects, benefit sharing and downstream 
communities.  
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3.3 DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUES 
 
Qualitative case studies utilize a triangulated research strategy in which multiple 
sources of data are examined to increase the reliability of the study by substantiating 
data gathered from multiple sources (Bowen, 2009). Such triangulation is important to 
decrease potential researcher and respondent biases that can result in skewed or 
inaccurate data as well as discover possible alternative findings (Yin, 1993). 
Methodological triangulation involves the utilization of multiple data collection methods 
in research. Of the four kinds of triangulation defined by Denzin (1984) including data 
source triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation and methodological 
triangulation, this study used the latter to ensure accuracy of data and thus credibility of 
the study. In this study, data collection techniques included document analysis, semi-
structured in-depth interviews, and focus groups. 
 
3.3.1Document Analysis 
 
Document analysis is an unobtrusive method of inquiry in which the contents of 
documents such as letters, advertisements, study reports, institutional reports, minutes 
of meetings, journals and newspapers are systematically examined for any relevant 
data which might contribute to the study at hand (Corbin & Strauss, 1998). Documents 
are useful in developing the substantive framework of the study, in providing the 
researcher with the background and historical context of phenomena being studied, in 
corroborating data with other sources and in assessing change and development. This 
qualitative research method can be more efficient, less time-consuming and cost-
effective than other methods as it involves data selection as opposed to data collection 
(Bowen, 2009). Other advantages of document analysis methodology include its 
unobtrusive and ‗non-reactive‘ nature as analysis of documents‘ contents has no impact 
on data, avoiding the problems of reflexivity found in other qualitative research 
techniques (in which the researcher‘s own biases or presence may skew what or how 
phenomena are observed) (Bowen, 2009). In addition, documents provide exact detail 
concerning dates and other details of events as well as giving broader coverage of the 
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issue being studied (Yin, 1993). Potential disadvantages of this qualitative research 
technique are lack of availability as some documents are not retrievable and biased 
selectivity in which the researcher fails to examine all relevant documents (Yin, 1993).  
 
Two kinds of documents were evaluated in this study. First, a comprehensive survey of 
relevant literature concerning large dams and their impacts was conducted to identify 
the available theory and literature on benefit sharing and downstream communities and 
to evaluate other research surrounding the impacts of dams, benefit sharing, and 
different approaches to development in general. As noted in the literature review 
chapter of this report, such documents were composed of previous reports of studies 
focusing on large dams (including studies of the LHWP itself)and literature concerning 
the conceptual debates surrounding megaproject development. Content analysis of 
such literature provided the researcher with an in-depth understanding of the historical 
context of large dams, international responses, policies and legislation concerninglarge 
dam development and other LHWP studies‘ findings as well as what issues have yet to 
be researched. 
 
The second document analysis technique involved examination of primary documents 
relevant to the study, a research tool that involves examining primary sources from the 
past which can include letters, newspaper articles, policy documents or other papers in 
which original information has not been interpreted and is presented in its original form 
(Mariampolski& Hughes, 1978). Primary documents examined for data collection in this 
study included international agreements and declarations concerning dams, World Bank 
and other funder policy documents, LHWP and LHDA policy documents, the LHWP 
Treaty and the Memorandum of Understanding between LHDA and the LLE association 
in Khohlo-Ntso. These were analyzed to establish a solid knowledge of the rights 
provided to dam-affected peoples, policies and practices of the LHDA and findings of 
the impacts of the LHWP on downstream communities.Both secondary and primary 
sources were used to guide interview questions and sub-research topics. In 
employment of the document analysis technique, it was important to consider the 
source and motivations of documents, whether documents contained accurate 
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information, and if other documents corroborated that information (Yin, 1993). 
Consulted documents were attained from various data bases including internet 
searches, the LHDA library, the University of Witwatersrand‘s libraries, LHDA‘s Panel of 
Experts reports and newspaper articles. 
 
3.3.2 Semi-Structured Interviews 
 
Semi-structured in-depth interviews have been defined as a ―conversation with a 
purpose‖ (Deflem, 1998). This qualitative data method involves interviews between the 
researcher and one or more study participants in which the researcher decides and 
guides topics that are discussed (Weiss, 1995). As opposed to survey interviewing, 
which presents interviewees with a list of set questions as the central instrument of 
exploration, researchers conducting semi-structured in-depth interviews are themselves 
the central instrument of investigation, loosely guided by an interview schedule setting 
out focal topics to be discussed without dictating exact questions or the flow of the 
interview (Weiss, 1995). Such qualitative interviewing enables researchers to develop a 
thorough understanding of participants‘ internal cognitions, perceptions and emotions of 
external events as well as their fears, hopes, values and goals. In addition, semi-
structured in-depth interviews can collect data enabling comparison between past and 
present inner feelings of respondents (Weiss, 1995). This method of data collection is 
particularly suited for exploratory research as it focuses on research problems not 
previously or comprehensively defined and provides researchers with a hermeneutic 
knowledge of participants‘ attitudes (Tellis, 1997). 
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Photo 12: The researcher‘s interpreter and friend, Sefiri Seepheephe, with an interviewee 
 in Motse Mocha. 
 
 
Weiss (1995) presents seven purposes for conducting qualitative interviews including 
developing detailed descriptions, integrating multiple perspectives, describing process, 
developing holistic description, identifying variables and framing hypotheses for 
quantitative research, learning how events are interpreted and bridging 
intersubjectivities. The semi-structured in-depth interviews conducted in this study serve 
the latter two objectives, specifically to make available a holistic understanding of the 
local residents‘ internal perceptions concerning benefit sharing within the LHWP. A total 
of 41 people were interviewed using the semi-structured in-depthinterviewing technique. 
Such interviews were composed of one pilot interview to develop the substantive frame 
of the study and illuminate study objectives, five key informant interviews (with LHDA 
officials, community leaders and a TRN activist) to collect data from people with first-
hand information and expert knowledge of the LHWP and its impacts on downstream 
communities,and 35 interviews with local residents of Khohlo-Ntso.  
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All in-depth semi-structured interviews were recorded on tape and conducted face-to-
face except for one key informant interview, which occurred over the telephone as the 
person was unavailable during fieldwork. While most local residents were interviewed in 
their homes, allowing the researcher to observe how participants lived, meet family 
members and enhance the comfort of participants, one participant elected to be 
interviewed in a classroom at Khohlo-Ntso Primary School, four in the researcher‘s own 
accommodation and one person in a field where the participant was resting after 
harvesting potatoes. The key informant interviews were conducted in LHDA offices, at 
Khohlo-Ntso Primary School and in one community leader‘s home.  
 
Interviews lasted from 30 to 90 minutes. As mentioned in the introduction of this report, 
the researcher was either known personally or known by many participants, thus the 
rapport between researcher and interviewees was very good. Ten of the interviews 
including the pilot interview and key informant interviews were conducted in English by 
the researcher while the remaining 25 interviews were conducted in Sesotho with the 
help of an interpreter. Taking into consideration Temple and Edwards (2002) findings 
that the active participation of interpreters is crucial to the final research product, the 
translator was first interviewed using the same semi-structured in-depth technique and 
interview schedule and played an active role in the interview process, providing clarity to 
participants‘ understanding of the topics being discussed, probing respondents for more 
information and assisting the researcher in data analysis. 
 
3.3.3Focus Groups 
 
The third methodological tool for data collection employed in this study was the use of 
focus groups. Morgan (1996) has defined focus groups as ―a research technique that 
collects data through group interaction on a topic determined by the researcher‖ 
(Morgan, 1996: 130). The use of focus groups in qualitative research is incremental in 
capturing group norms and cultural values and for determining levels of consensus and 
diversity of viewpoints among study participants (Kitzinger, 1995; Morgan, 1996). While 
focus groups compromise the confidentiality of participants and run the risk of silencing 
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individuals who disagree and/or are dominated by other more out-spoken participants, 
this qualitative method can be especially useful in determining issues not previously 
considered by the researcher, contributing to the substantive framework of the study 
and in determining important issues which could be explored more thoroughly in 
individual interviews (Morgan, 1996). In addition, focus groups sometimes give 
participants more confidence in discussing taboo topics, as well as allow the researcher 
to observe group dynamics and to discover similar experiences shared by participants 
(Ressel et al., 2002).  
 
Three focus groups conducted during the researcher‘s time in the field were 
fundamental to this study. Not only did the meetings provide a group forum in which the 
researcher could both assess participants‘ awareness of their rights under the Treaty 
and enable the construction of collective knowledge of this information among the group, 
but also allowed the researcher to utilize her limited time in Lesotho efficiently by 
incorporating more local residentsin the study while capturing internal perceptions of a 
broad range of participants (Ressel et al., 2002). As Kitzinger (1995) writes, ―group 
discussion is particularly appropriate when the interviewer has a series of open ended 
questions and wishes to encourage research participants to explore the issues of 
importance to them, in their own vocabulary, generating their own questions and 
pursuing their own priorities‖ (Kitzinger, 1995: 299). Most importantly, the inclusion of 
focus groups in this study provided an open forum in which local residentscould learn 
about the contents of the Treaty, discuss their frustrations and facilitate one another‘s 
generation of ideas for potential beneficial developments of the LHWP that they would 
like to see happen. Thus the experience was described as empowering by some focus 
group participants. 
 
Using a more standardized focus group format, each of the three focus groups were 
presented with the same interview schedule questions as individual interviewees in the 
semi-structured in-depth interviews. The design of the focus groups was ―more 
structured‖ in that the researcher kept the focus of discussion on specific topics, yet less 
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structured in that participants were given as much time to talk, bring up additional issues, 
ask questions and converse with oneanother (Morgan, 1996: 144).  
 
Each of the focus group sessions were conducted with participants sitting in a circle 
facing one another. While the first focus group discussion transpired in the communal 
waiting room at the village clinic, the following two were conducted in rondavals resided 
in by one of the focus group participants. Excluding the researcher and interpreter, 8 
local residents attended the first focus group, 6 local residents attended the second 
meeting and 9 participants were present at the third focus group. The duration of the 
first meeting was 95 minutes, with the second two focus group discussions lasting 50 
minutes each. All meetings were tape-recorded. The questions in each of the focus 
groups were asked in English, interpreted into Sesotho, and then responses and follow-
up questions translated in Sesotho and English respectively. 
 
3.4 SAMPLE SELECTION AND SIZE 
 
Crucial to both quantitative and qualitative research design, sampling is the systematic 
selection of units (which can be persons, objects or events) to be included in a study 
(Teddlie& Yu, 2007). The most frequently used sampling technique in qualitative 
research is purposeful (also referred to as judgment) sampling. Purposeful sampling is 
the process in which units are selected based on their potential to contribute the richest 
data to answer the research question (Marshall, 1996). Unlike quantitative sampling 
designs (probability sampling), which aim to be representative to an entire population 
and are focused on statistical generalization, purposeful sampling techniques are more 
concerned with theoretical generalization (Yin, 1993). This is because purposeful 
sampling techniques are best suited for research that is ―informed a priori by an existing 
body of social theory on which research questions may be based‖ (Curtis et al., 2000: 
1002).  
 
Qualitative samples are usually small in size, extensively studied, produce detailed and 
large amounts of data and their units are selected sequentially rather than 
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predetermined before commencement of the study (Curtis et al., 2000). While such 
qualitative sampling has been widely criticized for lack of generalizability, Stake (1995) 
introduced the concept of ―naturalistic generalization‖, which enables greater 
comprehension of the phenomenon under study due to the inherent intuitive 
characteristics of case studies and how they resonate with experiences of a diverse 
group of readers. Thus, though this study‘s findings are not representative of the 
Basotho population as a whole, nor all dam-affected communities, this report will 
contribute to shared knowledge of experiences of downstream dam-affected peoples. 
 
Due to the complexity of the research problem, this study employed multiple purposive 
sequential sampling techniques to collect as much detailed information as possible. 
Using theoretical sampling (units are selected based upon their contribution to defining 
or elaborating upon various manifestations of issues being studied), opportunistic 
sampling (units which present themselves unexpectedly during the study and that may 
potentially contribute important data are selected) and snowball sampling (selected 
units identify other elements that may provide useful information, these additional 
elements are studied and suggest other potential units and this process is continued 
until a point of saturation is reached when no other new elements can be found), units in 
this study sample were gradually selected rather than fixed at the outset of the research 
(Teddlie& Yu, 2007).  
 
LHDA has identified more than 80 downstream villages impacted by the construction of 
the Katse Dam. While qualitative studies that involve the inclusion of multiple cases of 
downstream communities impacted by large dam construction are crucial to developing 
both new policies and mitigation strategies for such communities, the time and financial 
restraints allowed the researcher to study only one case in-depth. Khohlo-Ntso was 
chosen as the study site due to the researcher‘s extensive experience living in the 
village. The researcher‘s intimate knowledge of the area and excellent rapport with local 
residentsallowed for a trusting environment in which information most often flowed 
freely and rich detailed data was captured. No ethical issues arose as informed consent 
was attained from each participant of the study and research presented no real risks to 
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participants (Miles and Huberman, 1994). While confidentiality was ensured to 
interviewees through signed confidentiality agreements, the lack of anonymity of focus 
groups was first discussed with respondents before they agreed to participate in the 
meetings.  
 
3.5 SELECTION AND DESCRIPTION OF STUDY AREA 
 
The site of research, Khohlo-Ntso, is a rural village in the Thaba-Tseka district of 
Lesotho. The village, located 10 kilometers from Katse Dam, is home to approximately 
3,000 people composed of 448 households spread throughout six sub-villages, namely 
Lebenkeleng, Ha Mothepo, Motse Mocha, Ha Sepiriti, Chaena and Linkoaneng. Set in 
some of the highest Maluti mountain ranges, Khohlo-Ntso experiences a harsh climate 
with long cold winters, periods of elongated drought and heavy winds. With an 
estimated 60 percent unemployment rate in the area, many of the able-bodied men and 
women have left the village in search of domestic or mining work in South Africa. Most 
people living in Khohlo-Ntso have minimal cash income, with most local residents falling 
below the US$1.25 poverty line.  There is no electricity or running water in the village 
and the one road that runs through the area remains unpaved with treacherous potholes. 
Though Khohlo-Ntso clinic provides some medical service to local residents, key 
medicines and equipment are absent as well as staff. A doctor visits the clinic only once 
per month (and sometimes less frequently) and is overwhelmed by a multitude of 
people in need of medial care that have often travelled far distances from neighboring 
villages. 
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Photo 13:One of five sub-villages of Khohlo-Ntso, Motse Mocha. 
 
HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis plague the area, with multiple funerals held every Saturday. 
Out of the 435 students enrolled in Khohlo-Ntso Primary School, the only school in the 
village, forty percent of the students are double orphans. The primary school, 
understaffed with more than 50 students per teacher and often under-supplied with 
exercise books, pens, and other learning materials well into the school year, struggles 
to provide a decent education to its students, with many children lacking shoes to climb 
the treacherous eroding mountain to reach the school and warm clothes to brave the 
area‘s bitterly cold winters. Few families can afford secondary school fees and related 
school expenses, thus less than 30 percent of residents of Khohlo-Ntso matriculate. 
Those fortunate enough to attend secondary school must leave their house at five 
o‘clock in the morning to reach school, located in Katse Village, and often return home 
well past dark. This is especially straining on girls who are expected to complete 
domestic chores before and after school. During the time that the researcher lived in 
this region, an eight-month drought resulted in substantial loss of livestock and maize 
crops, leaving the already nutritionally deprived local residents at an even greater loss. 
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Even during periods of adequate rainfall, cattle, sheep, goats, horses, and donkeys 
compete for overgrazed pastures, evident in the ribs and hipbones jutting from their skin. 
 
3.6 DATA PROCESSING 
 
Data processing is an analytic technique used in all quantitative and qualitative research 
studies. After qualitative data are collected, the researcher decides what will be 
analyzed and for what reason (Yin, 1993). Various qualitative data analysis techniques 
exist including pattern-matching, explanation-building and time-series analysis. The 
former was used in this study as thematic analysis (a form of pattern-matching in which 
categories of data analysis are determined by themes that emerge during the process) 
facilitated the researcher to not only develop the substantive frame of the study 
according to conceptual debates concerning large dam construction, but to also 
determine the most common themes emerging in interviews and focus groups 
(Fereday& Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Such themes were integrated with themes that 
emerged in document analysis and key informant interviews. 
 
Exact transcription of interviews and focus groups on Microsoft Word were undertaken, 
followed by color and number coding of this data. Themes included but were not limited 
to demographics of study participants (duration of time residing in Khohlo-Ntso, age, 
gender, number living in household), awareness of rights under treaty, perceptions of 
whether such rights were fulfilled, livelihoods before and after the LHWP, awareness 
and experiences with the LHWP, kinds of development local residents wanted to see as 
a result of the dam and suggestions for the future. These themes were each attributed a 
certain color and then correlating data was coded with color and ascribed a number 
depending on the response or position of that item. In addition, certain local residents‘ 
quotes were extracted from interviews and focus groups to provide a more personal 
account of research findings. 
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3.7 LIMITATIONS 
 
The following limitations constrained this study: 
 
*The content discussed in interviews and focus groups proved too complex for the 
researcher‘s basic conversational Sesotho skills, thus the use of an interpreter was 
required. As highlighted by Temple and Edwards (2002), cross-language research 
requires much more than a literal translation of exchanges as the symbolic and cultural 
meanings behind words are of equal importance as the words themselves. Though the 
translator was actively involved in the research project and possessed a comprehensive 
understanding of the research problem, it was impossible for the researcher to be 
certain whether both questions and responses were translated in the most favorable 
way to ensure accuracy of captured data. The interpretation process made it more 
difficult for the researcher to discern and examine important markers, thus follow-up and 
probing in some interviews and focus groups were constrained. However, such 
weaknesses were counteracted by the interpreter‘s extensive experience in translation 
and personal experience with the research problem as a native resident of Khohlo-Ntso. 
Additionally, the interpreter‘s excellent rapport with fellow community members 
accompanied by the familiarity of local residents with the researcher made the 
interviews and focus groups much more relaxed and productive. 
 
*As Khohlo-Ntso is located deep in the mountains of Lesotho and a seven-hour drive 
from Johannesburg (where the researcher lives), time, finances and transport were 
serious constraints in this study. Without access to private transportation, the 
researcher was able to spend a limited amount of time in the field conducting fewer 
numbers of interviews and focus groups,as the number of visits and time in the field 
were constrained by time and financial requirements of public transport. The availability 
of taxis in the area is limited and thus the researcher was forced to walk long distances 
to access LHDA offices. Thus most of the field research was conducted in the village 
itself and visits to Katse and Maseru, the locations of LHDA offices and other sources of 
key informants, were constrained. 
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*The study was conducted by a Master‘s student with little experience in qualitative 
research, potentially resulting in less detail collected in initial interviews.However, as an 
amateur researcher, interviewing skills of the researcher improved as the study ensued. 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo14:A study participant in the sub-village  
of Chaena sniffing tobacco. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
4.1 PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS 
 
Collected through face-to-face semi-structured interviews and one semi-structured 
telephone interview (all tape-recorded), responses to interviews were divided into 
fivecategories presented in the following sections below. Classifications of questions 
included the socio-demographic characteristics of local residents, study participants‘ 
reported impacts of the LHWP on their lives, their awareness of the Lesotho Highlands 
Revenue Fund (LHRF)(the benefit sharing mechanism employed in the LHWP), local 
residents‘ experiences with the LHRF and lastly, their suggestions for the future 
concerning benefit sharing within the LHWP. As the researcher did not collect socio-
demographic information on participants of the 3 focus groups included in this study, the 
data collected from this methodological tool was integrated into the latter four categories 
of questions (the same questions were discussed in these meetings as in interviews). 
 
The study at hand used a qualitative case study design with the aim of capturing local 
residents‘ experiences with and perceptions of the LHRF. The findings below are 
composed of the primary data collected in this study (from 36 interviews and 3 focus 
groups), with supplementary data collected from 5 key informants presented in the sixth 
section of this chapter. Though reformulated into the LFCD (as mentioned earlier in the 
report), the study referred to the LHWP‘s benefit sharing mechanism with the original 
(LHRF) name to avoid confusion. As only a few study participants were aware that the 
LHRF had been restructured, this did not pose a problem for accuracy of the data. Only 
the data collected through interviews and focus groups is presented here as information 
gained from primary document analysis has been integrated into other chapters of this 
report. All the data collected was provided with previous voluntary consent of 
participants and participants were neither guided nor coerced to give specific answers, 
thus the information below is direct descriptions of local residents‘ own individual 
responses to questions. 
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4.2 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS OF LOCAL RESIDENTS INTERVIEWED 
 
4.2.1 Gender 
 
Gender is a significant factor in how PAP experience impacts of large dams (WCD, 
2000). Other LHWP studies have reported that the Project has affected women in 
different ways than men, especially concerning compensation procedures and livelihood 
sustenance, thus it was important in this study to present the gender distribution of 
participants (Braun, 2010). Of the 36local residents interviewed, 26 (72.2 percent) were 
women and ten (27.3 percent were men). The gender discrepancy in this study can be 
attributed to two factors. First, there is an obvious gender division within Basotho 
highland culture in which men and women socialize in divided settings, thus making 
women more approachable and easier to talk to as the researcher is a young female 
(having a male Mosotho interpreter assisted in the inclusion of men in this study). The 
second factor related to the timing of the study, which was conducted during plowing 
season (a traditionally male task) that influenced the higher availability of women in the 
village when interviews were conducted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo15:One study participant sewing school uniforms as part of her 
 multiple livelihoods strategy. 
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Photo 16: A study participant posing at a local village pump. Basotho culture in the highlands is vey 
traditional, with most bo-ntate (men) wearing likobo (traditional blankets). This protects local residents 
from extremely cold winters experienced in Khohlo-Ntso. 
 
4.2.2 Age 
 
Average age of local residents was 51 years old, with the youngest study participant 
aged 30 and the oldest aged 80. 4 of the interviewees were 71-80 years (11.2 percent), 
3 were aged 61-70 (8.3 percent), 7 were 51-60 years old (19.4 percent), 10 were aged 
41-50 years (27.8 percent), and 12 were aged 30-40 years old (33.3 percent of 
interviewees). Local residents under 30 years old were purposely excluded from the 
study as they were deemed too young at the time of Katse Dam construction to 
remember how life was before the dam was built. Such comparison was important to 
this study because the LHRF was established in the early 1990s, thus participants 
needed to be at least 30 years old to provide detailed descriptions of experiences over 
the 25 year time period since initial construction works began.  
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4.2.3 Level of Education 
 
The majority of residents of Khohlo-Ntso are not able to access higher education 
(meaning secondary school and above) due to lack of cash incomes. For most 
highlanders, costs of secondary schooling is unaffordable with the average annual costs 
of school fees, exercise books, uniforms, pens and other necessary educational 
supplies estimated at more than US$420 (significantly more than the average village 
annual income). Therefore, it came to it is no surprise that 24(more than 65 percent) 
study participants had not completed secondary school, of which 10 (approximately 28 
percent) reported not having the opportunity to finish primary school. Of the 12 
interviewees (33.3 percent) receiving a full secondary school education, 5 (13.9 
percent) study participants had completed at least 2 years of university. In addition to 
lack of funds, pressure for children to contribute to livelihoods in highland regions of 
Lesotho is a major cause of low education levels (Turner, 1999). Furthermore, balisana 
(herdboys) rarely have the opportunity to attend school for more than a few years as 
most of their time is spent in distant areas of mountain ranges where richer grazing land 
is found. 
 
 
 
Photo 17: Balisana (herdboys) taking cattle out  
into the mountains for grazing. 
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Photo 18:Khohlo-Ntso school children posing  
in front of the old primary school. 
 
 
4.2.4 Period Resided in Khohlo-Ntso 
 
Of the 36 local residents interviewed in this study, 24 (approximately 67 percent) had 
lived in Khohlo-Ntso their entire lives, while 25 study participants (69.4 percent) reported 
that their family had lived in the research site for many previous generations. Only 4 
interviewees (11.1 percent) had resided in the study site for less than 20 years, while 
the remaining 8 local residents (22.2 percent) interviewed reported that they had lived in 
Khohlo-Ntso for more than 35 years. Respondentsresiding in the village for less than 20 
years were all females who had moved to the area after marriage (as traditional 
Basotho culture requires female to relocate to the husband‘s family residence). It was 
important to include this data in the study as experiences with benefit sharing within the 
LHWP may differ from region to region and the duration of residence in the study site 
could impact local residents‘ perceptions of and experiences with projects initiated 
under the LHRF. However, all study participants were originally from the Thaba-Tseka 
district, with most who had relocated to Khohlo-Ntso coming form nearby villages. 
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4.2.5 Livelihood 
 
One CARE study conducted in 1999 found that ―all mountain areas have at least 79% of 
their households under the poverty line – compared with a national average in 1999 of 
65%‖ at R80 per month (Turner, 2001: 19). The poorest highlanders are from the 
Thaba-Tseka district, home to this study‘s participants. Due to the impoverished nature 
and difficulty of mountain life in Lesotho, most Basotho have pursued multiple livelihood 
strategies over the past century (Turner, 1999). Combining subsistence agriculture and 
gathering of wild vegetables with South African mining remittances, sale of joala (home-
made beer), baked goods, handicrafts and other income generating activities, the 
majority of people in Khohlo-Ntso have difficulty feeding themselves and their families 
throughout the year. Nutrition levels in the village are extremely low, with more than 80 
percent of children reported as suffering form malnourishment (Turner, 1999). However, 
as an extremely resilient people, the combination of livelihood strategies, community 
support and food aid save the poorest of local residents form starvation.  
 
All 36 study participants reported engaging in multiple livelihood strategies.  Sixteen 
interviewees (44.4 percent) reported they owned fields from which they cultivated 
various crops including maize, beans, wheat, and sorghum, while 13 study participants 
(36.1 percent) mentioned animals as an important livelihood strategy. Other livelihood 
strategies reported by local residents included fruit trees, sewing and selling clothes, 
brickmaking, growing food in gardens, gathering and selling wood, sale of joala and 
cabbage and assistance from wealthier family members. Only 16.6 percent (6) of local 
residents participating in the study had formal employment (1 as a driver for LHDA, 1 as 
principle of the primary school, 3 teachers, 1 a local government employee). 2 other 
interviewees owned shops. Finally, 4 local residents reported having no means of 
livelihood at all, owning no fields, animals or other means of sustenance. 
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Photo 19: One study participant separating small rocks  
from harvested beans. 
 
 
4.2.6 Household details 
 
A household unit in this study included those people living in family compounds and 
sharing at least one meal a day. The average size of a household consisted of 6 people, 
with 5 interviewees (13.9 percent) having 1 other person or less living with them, 6 
study participants (16.7 percent) living with 3 other relatives, 12 local residentsresiding 
with 5-6 other people (33.3 percent), 7 respondents (19.4 percent) reporting they lived 
with 7-8 people, and 6 (16.7 percent) interviewees were found to live in a household of 
more than 9 people. Thus the total number of local residents living under households in 
this study amounted to a daunting 206, of which 141 (composing 68.5 percent of study 
household members) were dependents under the age of 18. Almost exactly even, 15 
interviewees reported living in male-headed households while 16 female respondents 
said they themselves were heads of the household.  
 
 
 
 
95  
 
Photo 20: One highland household. Households in Lesotho  
are often composed of three generations or more. 
 
 
4.3 REPORTED IMPACTS OF LHWP 
 
Though the document analysis component of this research (especially perusal of POE 
reports, LHDA documents and other LHWP studies) made it aptly clear that the Project 
has resulted in devastating impacts for LHWP PAP, it was considered important to ask 
questions encouraging local residents to give accounts of what kinds of impacts they felt 
had changed their lives the most. This information was necessary as the local residents‘ 
perceptions and experiences with the benefit sharing under the LHWP may be linked to 
what they perceive to be the costs and benefits of the Project to their lives. Questions 
included how local residents felt about the LHWP in general, what were their 
expectations of the project at the time of construction and now, what they experienced 
during and after construction of Katse Dam and whether themselves or the community 
as a whole has lost resources as a consequence of the Project. The data collected 
indicate a mixed range of attitudes and experiences among local residents regarding 
these questions. While some felt the Project had destroyed their way of life and 
harbored extremely negative feelings toward Katse Dam and LHWP, others responded 
 
 
96  
that changes brought on by LHWP had benefitted them and their children. Both 
perceived negative and positive impacts reported by interviewees are outlined on the 
following page.  
 
 
 
Photo 21:Orphans digging potatoes in Khohlo-Ntso. 
 
 
 
Photo 22: The one tarred access road leading from the lowlands  
of Lesotho to Katse Dam and surrounding areas. 
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Positive Impacts Reported by Local Residents 
 
While almost all study participants‘ expressed disappointment with the LHWP and the 
unfulfilled promises that loomed large around the dam and their community (94.4 
percent), more than half (53.2 percent) indicated they had benefitted in some way or 
another, either currently or during the construction phase of the Katse Dam. Positive 
benefits discussed in interviews included exposure to new knowledge (mentioned by 4 
local residents) including witnessing how other people lived, enjoying seeing 
automobiles for the first time and being exposed to other cultures (i.e. dress, different 
kinds of food, music). These issues were raised by younger study participants (in the 
30-50 age range) who also expressed a desire to live a more ―modern‖ lifestyle. Best 
reflected in the local residents‘ accounts themselves, excerpts from interviews 
presented below express such sentiments. 
 
You know when the dam was being built, it was very great to us because it 
taught us so many things, like before we did not know nice things like clothes, 
then the people from the lowlands, we saw many things from them, clothes, the 
way to do things because we watched them. It was very good because when you 
go to the lowlands, if you come from the mountains, before you speak people will 
see ahh, this one comes from the mountains, the way you wear is the way they 
will tell you. But now it helps us that the people can see we are the same as them 
now.(Female respondent, age 36) 
 
Our lives changed because even during the building of the dams, most of the 
people got jobs, eish, we saw so many things that we didn‟t know before, like 
some of the children, even us, didn‟t know about the vehicles. There were so 
many, different types of them. That changed a lot.(Male respondent, age 42) 
 
There were people who came from the lowlands to stay here. They hired our 
houses to stay, so they gave us money. We were able to buy clothes and food. 
Before that it was difficult, because sometimes I had to go to the mine workers 
and they would give me money for washing their clothes.(Female respondent, 
age 55) 
 
Other positive benefits brought to light by interviewees was greater access to the 
lowlands due to new roads, thus expanding the diversity of goods available in the 
community, the addition of new classrooms by LHDA to Khohlo-Ntso Primary School 
and new houses (in which 2 respondents still lived) established by LHDA. While 
interviewees mentioning the above benefits spoke in the present tense, most positive 
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impacts mentioned and discussed in interviews were spoken about in relation to the 
construction period of Katse Dam. These included new and bigger retail shops, an 
increase in employment opportunities and income generating activities including selling 
wild vegetables to construction workers and renting accommodation. The greater 
availability of cash incomes (discussed by a significant 25 percent of respondents) was 
the most frequently cited benefit enjoyed during the construction phase, allowing people 
money for school fees, clothes and other material goods they had not been able to 
afford before the project came into their lives. Such benefits are best expressed in the 
interviewees own words: 
 
This project somehow is very important for us because it helped us from the road 
from Mabalane to here. They helped us with the road from the lowlands up to the 
highlands, so it was very important for us because before they arrived here, 
everything was difficult. If we want to go in lowlands, it was too expensive, like 
when want to Leribe you supposed to use this direction of Maseru and the road 
was very bad before they arrived here. So they helped us with the road and 
everything is very easy now. And that thing I like it too much. They helped us 
also because when they arrived here, there was little shops, so when the road 
was open, the people started making big shops, like Kaste General. So now we 
have something, like Vaseline.(Female respondent, age 36) 
 
They use horses to get down to the lowlands before, but if you don‟t have horses 
we were to use this direction from here to Maseru and also to Leribe, so it was 
very difficult and the road was bad. Only 4X4‟s, and no public transport. Like the 
grocery, it was only medicine, but for now we can have big things if we want to 
buy. Like maybe, maybe you want to buy mealie, everything is easy, but before it 
was difficult. Before they built the dam, we were supposed to eat papa kameroho 
and wheat, but when they make the dam, it was very easy for us because now 
we can buy easy-bake, and 10 kgs of rice if you have money. But if you do not 
have money, it is still difficult. Life of the people who do not have money was not 
changed by the dam.(Male respondent, age 34) 
 
There are still many things that we have since Katse was built that we weren‟t 
able to have at the time. They sell water to SA and that money has made primary 
to be free. Before the dam, there was no free primary school, you had to pay the 
fees. It became free in 2000.(Female respondent, age 32) 
 
I have learned that there will be many people coming from many places that 
come to this project to work. Even our people got jobs because before the dam 
was built many of the people were not working. But after the project was finished, 
there were no jobs to do people were just staying at home and resting and doing 
nothing.(Female respondent, age 57) 
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There were many business people and the businesses at that time were very 
successful. People were making houses for people to stay to pay them rent, 
many shops were successful at that time. But not many people from KN found 
jobs building the dam because they were taking people from many 
areas.(Female respondent, age 65) 
 
We were so happy because we wanted our lives to be changed. We had people 
from our area going to find jobs in LHDA and also people were having money 
because they could sell things. People came and rented our houses and that‟s 
another way we got money. They made road maintenance. Before the roads 
were very bad. We made roads with our hands. It was horses most of the time 
and you can rarely see the car.(Male respondent, age 50) 
 
 
Negative Impacts Reported by Local Residents 
 
Much more time was spent on discussing adverse effects of the Katse Dam and 
changes the LHWP had brought to the area than on the positive impacts mentioned 
above. As adverse impacts have been widely documented by other studies and are not 
the focus of this research, data collected on such impacts are discussed here to provide 
the reader with an idea of how local residents perceived costs of the projects to 
contextualize how and why they felt they have, should, or could benefit from the LHRF. 
 
 
 
Photo 23:Dormitories built in Khohlo-Ntso to house dam workers during  
the construction period of Phase 1A. The structures have remained empty 
 for several years after exodus of migrant workers. 
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Photo 24:Deep culverts were created by LHWP access roads. 
 
Significant losses of resources reported in this study included loss of land due to the 
construction of roads (21 local residents, 58 percent), loss of medicinal plants (12 
respondents, 33 percent), loss of trees (9 local residents, 25 percent), loss of animals 
due to theft, drowning and starvation (9 respondents, 12 percent), and loss of grazing 
land (6 respondents, 16.7 percent). Also raised in interviews were losses associated 
with decreased amount of grazing land, sand available in the river, and less food 
availability. A few of the study participants (5 interviewees, 14 percent) discussed 
changes in water levels in Khohlo-Ntso River and adjoining waterways, lamenting the 
drastically reduced water available for washing clothes and blankets as well as water 
available for animals during periods of drought. Not only was the reduction of water a 
problem, but also the occasional artificial floods created by releases of water from the 
dam reservoir, which became a problem for those local resident who needed to cross 
the river to access other areas. Additionally, a significant number of respondents 
mentioned the increased need for cash to buy goods due to less natural resources 
being available since the time of construction began (mentioned by 5 local residents, 
13.9 percent). Such expressions of loss are presented in the study participants‘ own 
words on the following page. 
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Yes my family lost part of its farmland. I remember well even now they still get 
something. They were first getting food for the place that they lost, but right now 
it‟s money for that lost land. I don‟t think it‟s enough because the family land is so 
important. It‟s lifelong. But I think, that earning of money for that land won‟t last 
forever. By the time this started, they had estimated the time of getting 
compensation for up to 50 years. I‟m not sure how much money it is. The new 
generations will have nothing when the money finishes. In other words, we have 
lost. We didn‟t benefit anything since what they told them never happened 
because we were dreaming high. We thought it would bring changes, like the life 
would be the same as in the lowlands, they would create jobs by building the 
factories, so people who are not dedicated can have a job. And yet nothing, that 
didn‟t happen.(Male respondent, age 47) 
 
The community lost many things like the grass, when there is a lot of water, the 
medicinal plants are taken by the water and we have nothing and we have 
nothing to give the animals. We used Malimakatso river when there was a lot of 
drought, but now we have nowhere to go. Life was easier than now because we 
weren‟t thinking of money before the project, but now we wish we could get a job 
with LHDA, but before we milked the cows. Now it is very difficult because so 
many people suffer from HIV. Before I was able to take my children to school, but 
now I have less fields to grow things and sell.(Male respondent, age 56) 
 
Since this project has come to Lesotho, I can say that people are living on 
hunger because some of the fields have been taken by the dam and so some 
have been paid for that, some are not paid because they say that their fields 
have been taken just a little. Since this water project has come to Lesotho, 
people are starving because it made people have less food. And they have made 
the dongas which catch around the animals and we can feel so afraid when 
going because of the machines they have used for taking some concrete and 
they left them and they didn‟t leave some grass in places. The dongas can hurt 
the people because the robbers can hide in their in the evening after the sunset, 
you can‟t go there because you will be in danger.(Female respondent, age 38) 
 
A lot of disadvantages. We used to take the sand from the river to make the 
bricks, but now the sand is empty from the river, but nowadays, because the 
water does not move, there is not a lot of sand. Less water in the river, it used to 
flow more, but now it‟s dried up.(Male respondent, age 45) 
 
If the poor people could get some cash, rods going into the villages so the lives 
could be easier. Don‟t know about the treaty. They said the only people that were 
affected were the people from Makhoabeng, that side, those are the only people. 
The life before was good, because we had a lot of cash during the project, but 
after, food is hard to maintain, to keep the kind of food we were eating before the 
dam. Corruption, people started stealing property and things like that. Plus we 
don‟t have the medicine and all the herbs for medicine are all gone and the trees 
are all gone. One medicine  called koenea, it used to be around the edges of the 
river, and was used for stomach ache, throwing up and other things, but this is all 
gone now. There is more sickness now. The amount of water flow from the rivers 
is very highly affected because if you go down, like now when there is drought 
like this, we would take the animals down the rivers and the animals were having 
something to drink, but now, no water to drink. These are all the truth. Because 
 
 
102  
they promised people to work, but we never worked and we don‟t work now and 
there is not enough food in the families.(Female respondent, age 67) 
 
Yes, my family lost the fields. We were given maize only as comp., but only once 
a year in Aug. Its not that much good, we were promised more than this, but it did 
not happen. When you grow maize, you start eating it in March until June/July, 
but we are not given it in March, only in Aug. Before I was able to grow wheat, 
beans, pumpkin, vegetables, but now I only get maize.(Female respondent, age 
57) 
 
Accompanying the positive benefits associated with the sudden presence of foreigners 
in Khohlo-Ntso and surrounding areas, local residents discussed a multitude of negative 
consequences brought on by this influx of migrant workers. As the adverse impacts of 
boomtowns are widely documented, only a brief summary of the most frequently 
highlighted issues discussed by local residents are presented here. First, a striking 33 
(91.7 percent) brought up the increase of HIV in the community, most often discussed in 
relation to the change in teenagers‘ behavior. This was considered a serious negative 
impact of Katse‘s construction days, as younger adults were reported to increasingly 
disobey and disrespect their parents as the construction phase continued. Respondents 
reported that teenage pregnancy became more common and family conflict became 
rampant (extra-marital affairs was alluded to, but not referred to directly). One of the 
most harmful consequences discussed by this new exposure to the outside world 
(referred to by 18 study participants, 50 percent) was a change in self-perception on the 
part of local residents, seeing that they were poor in comparison with their new 
neighbors they watched drive past the village on a daily basis, with ―town clothes‖ and 
money to spend. Respondents reported this change of attitude having a negative impact 
on their satisfaction with the ways they were living and their overall happiness. The 
following excerpts from interviews demonstrate such lamentations. 
 
After they finished building the dam, small-scale retailers declined, there were no 
jobs and there were many diseases so people were dying. I see no advantages 
of dam. We are not able to visit across river and we miss people on the other 
side of the mountain.(Female respondent, age 43) 
 
Something that was worse that was experienced during the construction was that 
since there were too many people we also experienced so many people got 
diseases. I think that was because of too many people in one place.(Male 
respondent, age 38) 
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The people were left without working and they were starving and there were 
many orphans. Most of the people have been killed by HIV/AIDS and Lesotho 
was left with so many orphans. Even the shops were closed because the people 
have gone away and there was no money, some big shops have fallen down and 
now people are going so far for the shops such as long as Thaba-Tseka to get 
things they want because the big shops have fallen because no customers. They 
have taken their shops and gone away. Things were cheaper in the big shops, 
but now it is expensive to travel to Thaba-Tseka.(Female respondent, age 74) 
 
Our children became orphans. They were no more listening to the parents. The 
people were stealing while they were working and that was not nice to us 
because we didn‟t even see that kind of thing before. When they were living here, 
there were many new businesses that came, like selling beer, food and other 
things. They left and there was no jobs and our businesses stopped at that time 
because most of the people were far away. Not many people from here found 
jobs there, those people who were working there were from other districts. The 
weather is colder now. The fields are no more producing food as much, so now 
as I see when they made this dam, these problems started. Now the river is not 
good. We have the drought and there are some plants which are no more 
growing along the river.(Female respondent, age 59) 
 
HIV, Since the dam was built, teenagers started having children. They felt free to 
make babies, and they don‟t even ask. When I grew up, a married woman would 
have children, but that has changed now.(Male respondent, age 41) 
 
Its true that children did not respect the parents. Even some of the families have 
split because of the money that the operators and builders, the wives here were 
leaving the husband to go to those guys, so now there are some families which 
are broken up.(Male respondent, age 62) 
 
Like since Katse was built, the children are not listening to their parents, they do 
whatever they like, and there are so many diseases like HIV. There are so many 
people getting no benefits from Katse. Less poor? No, more poor now. Before 
Katse was built, there was a better system. If I wanted to buy your house, you 
would give me my sheep or goats and then you would give me the house. So 
now people are using money, so that is difficult for them since they are not 
working to be paid.(Male respondent, age 55) 
 
The kids started to use the glue and they started sleeping in the classes because 
they spent the last night not sleeping. And also the kids were not in 
control.(Female respondent, age 43) 
 
If the poor people could get some cash, rods going into the villages so the lives 
could be easier. Don‟t know about the treaty. They said the only people that were 
affected were the people from Makhoabeng, that side, those are the only people. 
The life before was good, because we had a lot of cash during the project, but 
after, food is hard to maintain, to keep the kind of food we were eating before the 
dam. Corruption, people started stealing property and things like that. Plus we 
don‟t have the medicine and all the herbs for medicine are all gone and the trees 
are all gone. One medicine  called koenea, it used to be around the edges of the 
river, and was used for stomach ache, throwing up and other things, but this is all 
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gone now. There is more sickness now. The amount of water flow from the rivers 
is very highly affected because if you go down, like now when there is drought 
like this, we would take the animals down the rivers and the animals were having 
something to drink, but now, no water to drink. These are all the truth. Because 
they promised people to work, but we never worked and we don‟t work now and 
there is not enough food in the families.The people that came from all over the 
country and some from overseas, they bribed the kids here, and they started 
sleeping with them and this is one of the problems that are here. Some of the 
kids were told to go to school, some of the kids instead of going to school. They 
would go to Katse and make their own business there.(Female respondent, age 
67) 
 
 
When discussing adverse consequences of the dam on their life, local residents most 
frequently talked about ways they had suffered when construction was complete. The 
few members of the study who worked at the dam site talked of losing their jobs while 
other study participants discussed decline of their businesses during this period. Many 
local residents reported feelings of being better off before the Project started, as cash 
had become an important element to their livelihoods when it was abundant during the 
construction period and they had no money when the dam was completed. Their new 
reliance on cash, accompanied by a new desire to live the ―town‖ life, left members of 
Khohlo-Ntso feeling dissatisfied and some interviewees reported new feelings of 
inadequacy in their ability to support their household and satisfy their family members 
new desires. While many other negative impacts were mentioned, including drowning of 
people in the dam, colder weather with heavier winds, decreased river water and quality 
and loss of mobility, the increased incidence of HIV (and drastically higher numbers of 
orphans), the change in young adult behavior and family unity accompanied by 
villager‘s decreased satisfaction with their life as it was before the project. 
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4.4 LEVEL OF AWARENESS OF LHRF 
 
Interview questions assessing levels of awareness of study participants pertaining to the 
LHRF included whether they knew how much revenue was generated by the LHWP, 
whether they were aware of their rights under the LHWP Treaty (compensation and 
standards of PAPs‘ living maintained), if they had heard about the LHRF, and how much 
LHDA had worked with the community to expand such levels of awareness. The 
concept of awareness was operationalized as how much information each interviewee 
was able to provide concerning these details of the LHWP. Awareness of such 
information was integral to the study as local residents‘ knowledge of these issues 
influenced whether they felt they had shared in benefits of the project. 
 
Of the 36 local residents interviewed, only 6 (16.7 percent) knew how much Lesotho 
made from selling water to South Africa, while 30 study participants had no idea how 
much the Project generated in revenues. When told that the government of Lesotho was 
paid more than 25 million rand per month in royalties, study participants were highly 
surprised and wanted to know where the money went, reporting that none of it had been 
used to develop Khohlo-Ntso or surrounding areas. It is notable that a community living 
only 10 km from the very place where most of LHWP water was stored had no idea the 
economic value of this natural resource to their country. Questions of why they did not 
receive any of the benefits generated by sale of what they deemed to be a communally 
owned natural resource were often raised when discussions of royalties occurred and 
respondents felt extremely disenchanted by this information. Descriptions of such 
sentiments are presented below. 
 
We don‟t know what happens with this money, but this is our water. Even when 
we have a very dry season, we don‟t use the water at all. (Female respondent, 
age 39) 
 
Yes, that one I think I‟m quite sure because we were once in Katse with the 
students and we were told that the Lesotho government is earning up to 25 
million per month for selling this water. I still wonder what happens with the 
money. I want to know. (Female respondent, age 53) 
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I don‟t know, but maybe 35 million a month. This money goes to the government. 
The government is just like LHDA, it promises to do the tar road, but it 
doesn‟t.(Male respondent, age 33) 
 
I don‟t know how much they make for selling our water. That‟s a lot of money (in 
response to being told the amount) I don‟t know where this goes. Not sure if 
money given to the grandfathers and grandmothers who are above 70 years, if 
this money is coming from SA. This money does not come back to me.(Female 
respondent, age 42) 
 
That money goes to corruption. No money comes back to Khohlo-Ntso, they 
didn‟t even make the roads to the villages, we don‟t even have the toilets. I‟m 
scared that they get 30 million per month. (Male respondent, age 54) 
 
That‟s a lot of money because everyone says Lesotho is poor. Our government 
says that. I don‟t know, maybe they take it in their pockets. None of it comes to 
KN. It has been announced two times that we need to get something because of 
the filling of water, but we never got anything and from there they never said 
anything.(Female respondent, age 68) 
 
 
No, don‟t know. What do they do with this money?? I have never heard that we 
get that amount. They just take it in their pockets, the government of Lesotho. 
Noone in Khohlo-Ntso gets anything from this.(Male respondent, age 73) 
 
I don‟t know if they were lying but they say the government gets 4 million monthly. 
Sometimes the money comes here for the local government so they sometimes 
pay people for working in the dongas and making furrows behind the fields. 
(Female respondent, age 45) 
 
As with the amount of royalties earned by Lesotho, levels of awareness of rights under 
the Treaty were extremely low, with only four (11.1 percent) of the local residents having 
any knowledge of the Treaty at all. When informed of such rights and asked if provisions 
in the treaty had been fulfilled, 20 (55.6 percent) indicated that they were worse off 
because of the Project and that such rights had not been respected. A significant 28 
percent (10 local residents) had mixed feeling about whether their standards of living 
had been restored, noting that while essential resources were lost due to the LHWP, 
their lives had been improved by the various positive impacts presented earlier in this 
chapter. When asked about the Treaty, responses of local residents included: 
 
I‟ve never heard of that.(Female respondent, age 46) 
 
Our rights were not respected. Life now is worse, bad behavior, many things. 
Some of them are because of the dam.(Male respondent, age 53) 
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The purpose was to develop the area. No, they haven‟t respected the community, 
some are getting compensation, but others are not and they have the same 
damage. So we don‟t know why some are getting and others are not 
getting.(Female respondent, age 68) 
 
No, I never heard of that. Life is more difficult now because we have no wood 
nearby, we don‟t have jobs, the fields were taken, people from far come here and 
work.(Female respondent, age 33) 
 
Most significantly, 94.4 percent of local residents were completely unaware of the LHRF, 
its objectives, and that it had been reformulated into the LFCD. They reported little to no 
interaction with LHDA management employees, finding it extremely difficult to access 
such people, to discuss impacts of Katse Dam on their lives or make inquiries about 
social and economic development projects. This indicated that after more than a decade 
of LHDA reports (in response to high levels of criticism from WB and others) 
broadcasting higher levels of awareness of the Fund and greater success in 
implementation of programs, the community of Khohlo-Ntso was still without knowledge 
of essential components of the LHRF and how it was meant as a mechanism to assist in 
increasing their welfare. As with other similar large dam project benefit sharing 
mechanisms that take the form of development funds, the lack of consultation and 
training of PAP indicates that into the twenty-first century, the LHWP has failed to 
incorporate equity into the distribution of benefits generated by the Project. 
 
4.5 EXPERIENCES WITH LHRF 
 
As the central aim of this research was to discover what local residents of Khohlo-Ntso 
had experienced with the benefit sharing mechanism incorporated into the LHWP 
(taking the form of the LHRF), questions regarding this issue comprised the main 
substance of this study. Such questions inquired whether any projects had occurred in 
Khohlo-Ntso under the direction of LHDA and details of such projects, whether the 
interviewee was involved in projects and whether projects had impacted the villager‘s 
life in any way. Responses to the above questions were used to assess whether benefit 
sharing had actually occurred for the community of Khohlo-Ntso, whether the LHRF had 
been successful in distributing benefits and why or why not. Thirty-one of the 36 local 
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residents interviewed (86.1 percent) reported having no knowledge of any projects 
executed under the LHRF by LHDA, 2 were unsure and 2 other study participants 
mentioned projects including brick-making, community sewing initiatives and a pony-
trekking cooperation. After further inquiry about these projects, it was discovered that 
members of the Khohlo-Ntso community were required to create cooperatives in order 
to accessR1.1 million allocated to the village as compensation for lost communal 
resources due to severe environmental impacts of reduced downstream river flows. 
 
 
Photo 25:Still unpaved after 25 years since the beginning of the LHWP,  
the one main road passing Khohlo-Ntso is poorly maintained  
and filled with deep potholes. 
 
Thus, the projects did not fall under the LHRF, but under the community compensation 
paid to downstream villages located within proximal reaches of the Katse and Mohale 
impoundment zones after the IFR studies discussed in the Chapter 2 of this report 
found that the Treaty scenario had resulted in massive loss of resources of downstream 
communities. While one million rand is not a significant amount of money for the 3,000 
local residents living in the community plus their future generations, the LHWP is one of 
few large-scale water projects (especially in the global South) to address impacts on 
downstream communities. The community compensation is meant to fund sustainable 
income generating projects to benefit the entire village, yet the money still sits in the 
bank after more than a decade of disbursement. Interviewees and members of focus 
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groups reported that the brickmaking and sewing projects had failed because 
equipment deteriorated and LHDA failed to replace broken machines. Additionally, 
quarrels within cooperatives concerning how to spend the money led to distrust and 
many members withdrew from the different cooperatives. 
 
 
 
Photo 26: An old sewing machine, a remnant of the LHRF's  
sewing project initiated in Khohlo-Ntso. 
 
 
23 percent of study participants reported that the committee created and trained by 
LHDA, (an LLE), charged 15 rand membership fees per year and respondents were 
either not able to afford this or not willing to pay the fee as they had seen nothing 
happen with the compensation money thus far. Others discussed corruption within the 
committee, which they accused of holding the money in the bank and pocketing the 
generated interest. Yet another story of corruption concerning Khohlo-Ntso‘s communal 
compensation referred to LHDA, where the Technical Assistant, charged with the 
responsibility of assisting LLEs to utilize compensation funds, asked for R6,000 to pay 
an accountant to overlook the committee‘s books and returned with neither the books 
nor the money. Data collected from interviews indicates that distrust of LHDA was 
extremely high within the community. Of those respondents interviewed who discussed 
what was happening with the money now, there is high hope that it will be put toward 
electrification of the village. A new committee has been formed in the past year and they 
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are now attempting to bypass LHDA and go straight to Lesotho Electric Company (LEC) 
to start negotiations for installing electricity in the village. However, when asked how 
people in the community will pay for the electricity once infrastructure is in place, the 
reply was that only one room of each house would be wired and people would pay as 
they could. As most people in the village are unable to afford paraffin, it is doubtful that 
many can afford LEC‘s relatively high monthly power bills. The excerpts from interviews 
presented below demonstrate the dissatisfaction with LHDA‘s efforts to implement 
development projects in the village and express the problems experienced by local 
residents with the compensation payment the village received. 
 
We have not seen anyone here doing studies on downstream impacts. There 
was someone who collected all the books to see what we want and how things 
could be improved, but this lady came and asked between 3000-6000, and she 
took the books and she took the money, and she brought the books back, some 
were missing, we don‟t see anything she did, everything was the same. This 
money was compensation money in winter 2010. The books for luma-luma, 
registration, things like how much money was used, what it was used for. Those 
guys what they want is to take out our money, because we tell them what we 
want, they don‟t do anything, in taking money, they do it, but listening to what we 
want, they don‟t. That‟s why we chose electricity because it can last forever. Now 
they are talking of doing electricity in the area, and the next money, if it comes, 
we can do things like raising up chickens and pigs, and that‟s why we want 
electricity, so we can start a factory and give people many jobs, to help out the 
orphans in the area.(Female respondent, age 47) 
 
Yes, they talked of some projects, but they didn‟t fulfill them. Catering, sewing, 
knitting. They were not successful. There have been no other projects. LHDA has 
been so bad because they started this project of sewing for handicrafts, and after 
some time they told us to pay for rent to use the houses and then we didn‟t have 
the money for the rent to pay and then the business was bankrupt. (Female 
respondent, age 44) 
 
The people of World Bank, many times they were telling lies because before the 
dam they made pitso, and they tell us they would give money, like everyone 
5,000, so many things, but they were lying because they didn‟t do it. The make 
pitso everywhere in the village. They said because we are now near Katse dam 
they want us to join together so that they will give us money so that maybe we 
can maybe buy pigs to sell, but this never happened.(Male respondent, age 53) 
 
What we do, before we tried to make the business, brickmaking, and there was a 
lady from LHDA and they said they will bring the people so we can buy them, and 
she was lying because she didn‟t bring them and the money was wasted 
because no one came to buy the bricks, about 20,000.(Female respondent, age 
43) 
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Concerning the community, all those were affected. It is true that we have the 
money, they say they will supply all the villages around the dam with the money. 
For KN it was 1 million. Because if you give someone too much money without 
teaching them how to use that money, it‟s like a play. But you can just see KN, 
it‟s just the same, with no improvement to KN because people don‟t understand 
the real mission of the money. It created jobs for people who never attended 
school. To build, to sew, and to knit. People do not still have these jobs today 
because they do not have the equipment, so they only have the knowledge, like 
they can knit, but they don‟t have the machine to sew and LHDA does not help to 
get the equipment. They say they only give them compensation for only what 
they have knitted. (Female respondent, age 36) 
 
That land, our plants, trees, grass for the animals. Yes, we received 
compensation, if I can still remember around 2000. Now it is 2011, still that 
money is in our hands in the bank, so we, now as the community, we are not 
coming together. Because you see, we have so many options, but we don‟t 
agree on one. But now of late, we have decided to buy electricity.You know, I 
don‟t like it. For the first time, when they choose this place, we went to the 
government. It is still changing our lives. We are poor poor. They should at least 
give us money or jobs. They have taken our land here, but they failed to give us 
anything for it.(Male respondent, age 57) 
 
One time I was at school and when I returned, I found a letter from the chief‟s 
place saying that I am the one they have selected to go to Mexico to talk about 
the LHWP, so I packed myself, I spent my money to buy some clothes. Then 
those who were coordinator with the water supply, I had been announced 
through the radio saying I am the one to be going to Mexico. So I prepared and 
asked permission from who I am working, then I think I spent the whole day here 
waiting for them to take me. They did not come to me to say Me Teresia, we are 
no more taking you, we have taken someone. Because they say these people 
can choose one and so they chose me. I think because the one from the water 
supply asked me to not agree with the statements saying that we don‟t have 
toilets, water in our houses. I said Ntate, I cannot say that, people have chosen 
me because they trust me to tell the truth. 2006 I think.(Female respondent, age 
31) 
 
Yes, we work with „M‟e … (name deleted for confidentiality purposes). 
Sometimes she comes once a month, sometimes she comes once in two months. 
Another „M‟e was coming more often. She was helping the community more 
because she helped us buy those machines for sewing. Me …. is a tsotsi. She 
has done nothing for us. She came to pick up the committee, those people she 
picked to put in the big committee with the 22 villages, but she picked her own, 
she didn‟t involve everybody. And also she just called the committee  to a place 
without informing all the people.(Male respondent, age 33) 
 
LHDA talked of protecting soil erosion for the locals and for the fields, but they 
never did. They played with the people. They did the quarries and left everything 
like that without planting grass or anything like that. It was the best if the amount 
of money they gave, if they were giving it, period after period, so we could look 
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after their families. They never paid for the quarries or anything like that.(Female 
respondent, age 67) 
 
 
 
 
Photo 27: The remnants of equipment used for the 
Brick making project under one community compensation project. 
 
 
Therefore the main research findings of this study were extremely low levels of 
awareness of the LHRF and rights of LHWP PAP under the Treaty, changed 
perceptions of self wealth and adequacy as consequences of influxes of foreigners in 
the Khohlo-Ntso area during dam construction, and no projects had been successfully 
implemented under the LHWP‘s main benefit sharing mechanism. In addition, there was 
much confusion in the village surrounding the communal compensation granted to 
Khohlo-Ntso. LHDA had not made a distinction between development projects initiated 
under this money and those under the LHRF. As to answering the research question of 
what have local residents of Khohlo-Ntso experienced within the LHRF, the unfortunate 
overwhelming answer is dissipated hope and distrust in the government as expressed in 
the following excerpts from the study participants‘ own words below. 
It seems like all of these people are corrupt. When the WB was here, they said 
they would do this and this and that, but after the WB manager left, they never 
did anything. Sometimes you find one guy is having 5 orphans and it is hard to 
take care of them, but then we have this money from LHDA which needs to work 
on that to help those, but it doesn‟t do anything. We have so many old people 
taking care of kids now, but nothing is happening. (Female respondent, age 36) 
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They said we were going to have a better life, electricity, clean water, all these 
things, but now we don‟t have. None of the promises have come through. 
(Female respondent, age 57) 
 
Our feelings were high then, hoping that we were going to have a better life. But 
if you just compare the people that are in Katse Village and you compare them 
with people who are outside of Katse, their standard of living are better than the 
people outside of this scheme. (Female respondent, age 33) 
 
Yes, we were promised people would come stay in these houses we built for five 
years. Now they are empty. They came to rent the houses for 8 years, but then 
nothing. That building was for the post office, but after we can‟t even use the post 
office because they have broken the windows, the doors, everything.(Male 
respondent, age 42) 
 
I have learned that there will be many people coming from many places that 
come to this project to work. Even our people got jobs because before the dam 
was built many of the people were not working. But after the project was finished, 
there were no jobs to do people were just staying at home and resting and doing 
nothing.We were feeling happy at first because we heard there would be many 
jobs for many people, but there was not. They said that Lesotho would become 
so rich and maybe the economy would go up. They say that even electricity 
would be there in the villages, but we don‟t see it, but it not there at all. There 
were many people from many villages, some got jobs, some did not. They 
changed the life of the village. Some steal because of hunger. That made us so 
poor. They were stealing because there were no jobs, there was no place to stay. 
Some were stealing animals from the villages, so they left us.(Male respondent, 
age 48) 
 
It‟s very painful because they take the water from us here, but we still need the 
water and we don‟t see the benefit, we don‟t get anything. They talked of 
irrigation for the plants and the field and things like that, but now they never did 
that. LHDA does not help us.(Female respondent, age 63) 
 
 
Ninety-three percent of interviewees reported that they had been happy and hopeful 
when first hearing about the project, believing that it would improve their lives. As most 
study participants recounted promises made to them by LHDA when the construction of 
Phase 1A of the LHWP had just begun, they expressed regret regarding their belief in 
the early 1990s that these things would come true. Promises included employment, 
improved quality of education, paved roads, electricity, in-door plumbing and enrichment 
of the Basotho population as a whole. All of these projects were supposed to happen 
under the LHRF. As none of the promises came to fruition (with the exception of 
classroom additions made by LHDA at the primary school), local residents of Khohlo-
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Ntso instead experienced family and community social disarticulation as communal 
compensation resulted in conflict and distrust of one another. 
 
 
 
 
Photo 28:A village watering point in Khohlo-Ntso constructed  
by LHDA in the early to mid-1990s. 
 
 
 
 
Photo 29:Marketing stalls constructed by the LHDA which have 
nowremained unused and empty for several years. 
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Photo 30:Students and teachers of Khohlo-Ntso Primary School crowded 
 into one older classroom to view a movie.As the village has no electricity,  
the television was run from a generator. 
 
 
 
4.6 HYDROPOLITICS AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL 
 
As with all communities, Khohlo-Ntso is highly differentiated in its composition of 
residents. Participants in the study group not only varied in age, gender, length of 
residence in the area, level of education attained and size of household, but also in 
socio-economic status. While measuring how the LHWP affected different groups within 
the Khohlo-Ntso community was beyond the scope of this study, it is important to note 
that local residents‘ experiences with the Project and the LHRF varied. This is likewise 
true of study participants‘ awareness of the Treaty and the LHRF as well as the 
compensation the village received for losses endured due to the LHWP. The few 
respondents that expressed positive benefits of the Project (5.6 percent of the study 
group) were younger, received higher levels of education and were employed in the 
local government or had at one time worked for the LHDA as drivers. Each of these 
interviewees were aware of the LHWP Treaty and could differentiate between projects 
attempted under the LHRF and those that occurred due to the compensation the village 
received. They were also among the respondents that expressed mixed feelings about 
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the LHWP who cited exposure to other cultures and technology as major benefits of the 
Project.  
 
As with Braun‘s (2010) research, which found that women experienced greater adverse 
impacts of the LHWP than men, when disaggregating data collected in the study at 
hand, it became evident that women experienced impacts of the LHWP much differently 
than men. While the most frequently mentioned adverse impacts mentioned by men in 
this research was loss of grazing land, deteriorating health of animals and livestock theft 
and marital affairs of local female residents with migrants working on dam construction, 
women more often discuss loss of food availability, higher incidence of diseases 
(especially HIV) and an the related increase in numbers of orphans and loss of mobility 
to visit family members and friends living in villages located across Katse dam.  
 
Most notably, those interviewees who had the means to build houses to rent to people 
migrating to the area during dam construction, those who owned shops and those who 
had at one point in time worked in some capacity for LHDA all noted benefits brought to 
them by the LHWP. In contrast, study participants who lacked such opportunities for 
income generation during and after dam construction were found to express negative 
sentiments concerning the project and LHDA much more frequently. Additionally, 
interviewees possessing access to some form of cash income who could afford to pay 
the fee required to become a member of the association responsible for managing 
compensation reported higher hopes that the Project would eventually benefit the 
village (particularly through using the compensation money to install electricity in the 
village), while those who were not part of the association largely expressed lack of hope 
that the LHWP would improve their lives in the future. The difference between such 
sentiments are presented in the local resident‘s own words found below. 
 
Even the community around here that have lost some of their things, they get 
something for that. Even for grazing land, they get something for that. The money is 
for the community as a whole. They stick together, decide what they can do with the 
money. Just like, now, at our place, we have applied for electricity in Ha Nkokana. I 
think Khohlo-Ntso  will try to get the same thing. (Male respondent, age 53, member of 
compensation association) 
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Yes, I know about 1 million in compensation money, but I don’t know where it is now. 
We wanted the electricity installation, but they don’t install it in time. The community 
is in charge of this money. I think electricity is the best since it lasts and the 
grandchildren will find it. We’ll pay 50 rand maybe monthly until it makes 2000 rand. 
(Female respondent, age 41, member of compensation association) 
 
Because I am not a member of that association, I do not know what they do with that 
money. Because there is a subscription fee we pay, I don’t have the money to join. I 
don’t know how much it is, but maybe ten rand. (Female respondent, age 36, not a 
member of compensation association) 
 
Yes, the community lost land, the biggest thing, but we also lost trees, fodder, medicine. 
No, community was not given anything for these losses. The money was given to the 
luma-luma in 2003. It was given to bring development in the area, we are still in the 
process. Yes, I am a member. We want to bring electricity in the area. I don’t know if 
everybody will be able to afford to buy electricity every month. I would make sure 
everyone has good food, but electricity is the best because it affects everyone in the 
area. (Male respondent, age 43, member of compensation association) 
 
Yes, I heard about luma-luma, but I never been part of it because I didn’t have 15 rand. 
I really want to be part of it, but my problem is I cannot pay. Yes, I think electricity is 
good but I don’t know how we will all benefit because many many people here have no 
money to pay for paraffin, so how will they pay for electricity? The people who want to 
spend the money on electricity have money, but what about all of the people without? 
(Female respondent, age 67, not part of compensation association). 
 
 
Thus, as at the international and national levels, the hydropolitics of the LHWP has 
infiltrated the community of Khohlo-Ntso. While class differentiation in the village most 
likely existed before construction and operation of Katse dam, certain responses 
provided in the 36 interviews in this study point to variation in access to benefits of the 
LHWP among local residents depending on their access to cash income. This may be 
one reason for the commonly expressed view that the Project had resulted in some 
level of social disarticulation within Khohlo-Ntso. Though the lack of time and resources 
to further delve into this apparent impact of the LHWP on local residents was limited in 
the study at hand, it is strongly suggested that future research be conducted evaluating 
the LHWP‘s impacts on internal dynamics of dam-affected communities. 
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4.7CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The results of this study are disappointing, yet not surprising. As we have seen, 
international experiences with benefit sharing and hydropower projects in the global 
South have not met with much success. Benefit sharing mechanisms that take the form 
of development funds are easily mired in elite political capture and inefficient 
bureaucracies which prevent monetary benefits of large-scale water and hydropower 
projects from reaching local populations. The case of Khohlo-Ntso demonstrates that 
problems may erupt at many institutional levels where large sums of money are 
concerned. Whether conflict and mistrust begins at a community or municipal or 
national institutional level, this study demonstrates that despite years of criticism and 
forced reform, management of the LHRF (now LFCD) has not improved. Rather than 
enhance economic and social opportunities for the local residents of Khohlo-Ntso, the 
LHWP benefit sharing mechanism as well as its communal compensation policy, has 
only heighted tension between community members themselves and between the 
village and LHDA. The majority of study participants remain unaware of their rights 
under the LHWP Treaty, feel that the LHWP has adversely affected their lives, have 
seen few or no projects implemented under the LHRF and remain skeptical that they will 
benefit from the LHWP in the future. Though the LHWP is the first large-scale water 
project to compensate downstream communities, it appears that compensation 
measures have proved highly inadequate to mitigate the severely negative impacts of 
dam construction and operation on the community of Khohlo-Ntso. 
 
 After thorough examination of other international experiences with benefit sharing, no 
one best option becomes apparent. Advocates of local dam-affected communities are 
recommended to examine a legal route through which to assist PAP regain their basic 
human rights and fight for an equitable share of what was once a local resource 
communally shared amongst themselves. Only once the World Bank and other major 
funders are compelled to turn rhetoric into practice will the potential for benefit sharing 
in the southern countries be realized.  
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4.8SUGGESTIONS FROM LOCAL RESIDENTS 
 
The final section of this study concludes with suggestions made by the local residents 
themselves regarding how they believe they could equitably share in benefits of the 
LHWP, and what advice they would give local residents of Polihali where the next 
LHWP dam will be built next year. When asked how they felt they could best share 
benefits under the LHWP and how the LHRF could improve their lives, 98 percent of the 
responses provided by interviewees involved projects that were named as 
responsibilities of the LHRF (renamed the LFCD) initially. A laundry list of such projects 
included: modern houses with in-door plumbing, training programs for skills 
enhancement, a grinding mill, chicken and clothing factories, electricity, better roads, 
more schools, a mortuary, dairy cows, irrigation for fields, pig projects, a blanket-making 
business, more clinics and hospitals fully staffed with doctors available at all times, 
fisheries, bricking-making businesses, forestry projects, a bridge for the school, tractors 
for plowing and other small business ventures. Only one study participant mentioned 
direct monetary distribution as members of the study expressed desires for long-term 
sustainable projects, which could benefit future generations. It was recognized that cash 
payments did not last. Thus, local residents in Khohlo-Ntso do not have high demands 
of the LHDA or their national government, but simply want the same kinds of regional 
economic development projects first promised them at the beginning of the Project. The 
below excerpts highlight the most common suggestions of how study participants felt 
they could benefit from the LHWP, followed by advice to residents of Polihali where the 
next LHWP dam is to be constructed in 2013. 
 
I would ask for money to start my own business like a shop. (Female respondent, 
age 38) 
 
I would start businesses in the villages like factories for fish and I would bring the 
electricity to the village.(Female respondent, age 31) 
 
We would tell LHDA to bring electricity here and also to take care of the orphans 
in the area, who are about 150 or more orphans, especially just to provide 
education for them. Also, I would like to see businesses started like to make 
bricks, to buy paper mill, maize grinder or to buy the truck to rent out.(Female 
respondent, age 52) 
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Because we have water and they sell that water to SA, they should bring us the 
toilets, help us with the dry times here for our fields. (Male respondent, age 42) 
 
They must make sure we have electricity, we have access to communication, 
here in Khohlo-Ntso we were using the tower and it was struck by lightning and 
even now it hasn‟t been sorted out. Also, make sure people get jobs there.(Male 
respondent, age 57) 
 
Na, I don‟t think I need so many things. I could just suggest that we get better 
roads from here to Thaba-Tseka, this is our main problem. They have been here 
among us, they have used some of our things, and so on. Electricity, if it is 
impossible to do on our own, they can help us with that. About businesses, I think 
every business that can be brought to us can be ok, even though I am not sure 
what I might want, any business that keep our people doing something.(Female 
respondent, age 63) 
 
I would like to make some projects because we are just doing nothing. We have 
got the goats, so we can wash the wool and also factory to make clothes 
here.(Male respondent, age 49) 
 
We could set up a market place and start poultry businesses and have 
pigs.(Female respondent, age 48) 
 
 
To the communities surrounding Polihali: 
 
“I would just advise them that they must have a strong team or a strong committee that will try to 
manage everything going into their place. First of all you can say if you compensate us, you 
must do it before, don‟t just say we shall. Like people who will work there, the people in that 
area should get the jobs first unlike here where many people who got work were from the 
lowlands and other places. Besides that, they must try to train the people to have the work there. 
Here the compensation happened afterwards and they failed most of them.” 
 
 
“They should help before Polihali dam is built, they should have something made for them that 
something will last long.” 
 
 
“Really, the dams they can make after this one, they can make a lot of improvements. Like the 
houses they built, they were not good. So to make better houses. And electricity. Look, Katse 
village has electricity, why do we have to use our own money, why can‟t they do this for us so 
we can do something else with that money.” 
 
 
“I‟m laughing because those people are going to get problems! I would say its much better not 
to build dams at all!! Because they are NOT going to do those things. I know them. They only do 
it to make themselves rich.” 
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“To give people affected by the dam the first priority. To tell the people that the dam is coming 
and to teach them about it.” 
 
 
“They should be aware of these people working in LHDA because they don‟t fulfill their promises. 
They only want themselves to be rich, they don‟t care about the villages. They should also be 
aware of people who come there because when they arrive there, they are going to steal.” 
 
 
I” would tell them that the project is helpless to them because they will promise everything, but 
won‟t fulfill anything.” 
 
 
“I would suggest that those people they have to be in the LHDA to decide how much money, 
what to be done with the villages and all that.” 
 
 
“I would tell them that they need to know that their kids will make other kids and the kids will be 
out of control and sometimes when you try to discipline them they tell you you live your own life.” 
 
 
 “I would suggest that whatever they agree, they have to sign it up and also it has to come to 
pass.” 
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APPENDIX A : VILLAGER INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
 
LHRF AWARENESS 
 
1. Are you aware of how much Lesotho gets paid for selling LHWP water? (Where is money  
allocated? Do funds return to Khohlo-Ntso?)  
 
2. Have you heard of the LHWP Treaty? (How heard? Aware of rights? Rights fulfilled?) 
 
3. Have you heard of the Lesotho Highlands Revenue Fund? (How? What do you know? Aim of  
LHRF) 
 
4. Did project coordinators visit the village to talk about LHRF? (When? How often? Relationship? ) 
 
 
IMPACTS OF THE LHWP 
 
1. What were your expectations of the LHWP when you first learned of the project? 
 
2. What did you think about the project at that time?  
 
3. Did building of the dam change the way you lived? How?         
 
4. What happened when the project was completed?  
 
5. Did you/your family lose any land or other assets because of the dam? (Compensated? How  
much? When?) 
 
6. Did the community as a whole gain/lose access to any resources?  (If yes, compensated? How?  
     Management? Distribution?) 
 
7. Does anyone from K.N. work for LHDA? (How many? Members of your family? How long? Type of  
job?) 
 
 
EXPERIENCES WITH THE LHRF 
 
1. Have any projects occurred in K.N. under direction of LHDA?  (How often visited by reps of LHDA?      
     Expectations? Success/failure of projects? Benefitted village?) 
 
2. Were you involved in any of the projects? (How long? Personally benefitted?) 
 
3. Do you think the LHRF has changed how you live/your life now? (Family life? Culture?) 
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SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
 
1. If you were mookameli of LHDA/in charge of how water royalties were spent, what kinds of things  
do you think would benefit K.N. most? 
 
2. What projects do you think would be most helpful in K.N under the LHRF? 
 
3. What advice would you give people living in Polihali? (How best could they share in benefits?) 
 
 
DEMOGRAPHICS 
 
1. How long have you lived in Khohlo-Ntso?  (Generations?) 
 
2. What is your level of education? 
 
3. How many people in household? (# children, household head?) 
 
4. How old are you?  
 
5. How do you make your livelihood? (Employed? Now compared to before dam?) 
 
6. Has your/your family‘s livelihood been changed at all by LHWP? 
 
7. Is there anything else you would like to add? 
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APPENDIX B: KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
 
1. How have you been involved in the LHWP? (How long? What is your specific role?) 
 
2. What can you tell me about the LHRF? 
 
3. Have you been involved with any projects under the fund? (When? What kinds?  
Experience?) 
 
4. What were the aims of these projects? (Achieved objectives? Why? Why not?) 
 
4. Were communities downstream of the dam involved in choosing/planning/implementing    
projects? 
 
5. Did any trainings to increase capacity of local residents?  
 
6. How were local residents motivated to participate in projects? (What level of participation?  
    Level of cooperation?) 
 
6. Did local residents benefit from projects? 
 
5. How were projects funded? (Local residents have control over money?) 
 
6. Was funding sufficient to achieve objectives? 
 
7. What were benefits of projects? 
 
8. What were challenges of projects? 
 
9. What kind of improvements do you think would enhance project performance? 
 
10. Anything else you would like to add? 
